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ABSTRACT
Newell, Alan S., December 14, 1979

History

A Victim of Monopoly: Samuel T. Hauser and Hydroelectric
Development on the Missouri River, 1898-1912 ( 143 pp. )
Director:

H. D. Hampton

In 1898, ex-Montana Territory Governor Samuel T. Hauser com
pleted construction of a hydroelectric generating plant on the
Missouri River near Helena, Montana. An aging Hauser, having
suffered serious financial reverses in his other economic con
cerns, entered the new Montana electrical industry with plans
for three generating facilities. Between 1898 and 1908, S. T.
Hauser completed the construction of two dams and power plants
(Canyon Ferry and Hauser) and planned the erection of a third
dam (Holter). In addition, Hauser's companies financed the
construction of a transmission line from Helena to Butte and
Anaconda, Montana.
S. T. Hauser did not build his hydroelectric plants without
competition. Acceptance of electrical power by various elements
of Montana society, including the rapidly consolidating mining
industry, produced a favorable climate for competing hydro
electric interests in the state. Hauser1s two challengers were
John D. Ryan, representing the electric power interest of Great
Falls, and Charles W. Wetmore, representing power interests in
Butte. Of the two individuals, John Ryan proved to be the
greater threat to Hauser. Ryan's corporate ties to the Anaconda
Copper Mining Company (Amalgamated Copper Company) allowed him
to combine his interests with those of Wetmore and to drive
S. T. Hauser from the power industry.
Hauser failed in his efforts to protect his Missouri River
power plants from being purchased by the Ryan/Wetmore syndicate.
Although he had been in the forefront of promoting and develop
ing the new source of power, an elderly S. T. Hauser was not
able to retain the support of Amalgamated and had to relinquish
control of his property in 1911. Formation of the Ryan/Wetmore
syndicate and Hauser's failure prefaced establishment of the
Montana Power Company in December, 1912. The creation of that
corporation and the surrender of S. T. Hauser's power companies
to the new firm evidenced the strong tendency in Montana towards
monopolization of hydroelectric facilities.
ii
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THE RIVER AND INDUSTRY

When American explorers first entered the present state of Montana,
they did so via a primary regional waterway.

Those preeminent adventur

ers, Meriwether Lewis and William Clark, entered the Missouri River in
the spring of 1804 in anticipation of following that great river to the
Pacific Ocean.

It was a notion buttressed by years of experience on

rivers east of the Mississippi, but it was an idea that quickly died
when confronted with the unpredictable character of western watercourses.
While Lewis and Clark may have been disappointed with the navigability
of Montana's most prominent river, the prescience of their focus on
the Missouri was uncanny.
Less than a year after the return of the Lewis and Clark Expedi
tion, fur trading entrepreneurs were venturing onto Montana rivers.
By the 1840s, posts along the upper Missouri carried on a brisk trade
with native populations--receiving trade goods transported by riverboat and shipping furs by the same means to the downstream port of
St. Louis.

In 1860, the first steamboat ascended the often treacherous

Missouri River to the American Fur Company outpost at Fort Benton.
The history of steamboat travel on the upper Missouri River is
one of precarious spring ascents, which often ended with a floundered
sternwheeler perched atop a hidden sandbar.

The river was tolerated at

best, and quickly abandoned in the 1880s when a more assured means of
travel was available on railroads.

Despite this seeming rejection,
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the Missouri continued to support a variety of local enterprises.

It

served as a vehicle for delivering logs from the forest north of Helena
to the great falls beginning in the 1880s.

The river also supported a

small cargo trade south of the community of Great Falls in the eighties
and, during the nineties, offered a source of recreation to boating
enthusiasts.

The very substance of the river, its water, was employed

by local agriculturalists as it was diverted into irrigation ditches and
returned downstream to continue its course to the Mississippi.

Through

all of these uses, the significance of the Missouri River to the economic
development of Montana is evident.
Still, the river aided yet another industry during the last decade
of the nineteenth century.

That industry was mining, and its importance

to Montana was enormous.
Although the state's natural resources supported a variety of
exploitative enterprises from fur trading to open range cattle ranching
to lumbering, it was the mining industry that had the greatest impact
on its land and its people.
The prominence of the mining industry in Montana can be attributed
to a variety of factors.

Certainly, the most important element was the

abundance of mineral wealth in the state.

The discovery and development

of gold and silver lodes in the 1860s and 1870s were but precursors to
the great wealth of copper that was extracted from the hills around
Butte beginning in the 1880s.

The capital required to tap the state's

mineral deposits necessarily attracted huge sums of investment monies
from national and foreign financiers.

The influx of these funds into

the state brought with them attendant influence in many aspects of
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Montana's economic, social and political life.

Significantly, the mining

industry is important to Montana for its urbanizing effect.

The com

munities of Butte, Anaconda, Helena, and Great Falls owe their existence
to the presence of mining.

In many respects, their history can be

charted with the expansion and contraction of that industry.
The link between the Missouri River and Montana's mining industry
is energy—more specifically electricity.

At the same time that mining

entrepreneurs made their initial investments in the copper lodes around
Butte, other capitalists laid the foundation for electrical generation
and consumption in Montana.

It is not a coincidence that the first

applications of electricity in Montana were in the communities of
Helena, Butte and Great Falls, or that some of the first industrial uses
of the new energy were in lighting the region's mines.

Neither is it

coincidental that some of the first developers of electricity in the
state were men who were tied to the mining industry.
Samuel T. Hauser was such an individual.

Having been involved in

mining from his earliest days in Montana Territory, he clearly saw the
practical application of electricity to industrialization.

His develop

ment of hydroelectric power plants at three sites on the Missour River
evidenced a commitment to the new energy source.

By following

S. T. Hauser's course from 1898, the year he completed his first hydro
electric facility, to 1912, the year he resigned as president of his
electric power company, one can trace the interrelationship between
the river, electricity, and the mining industry.
S. T. Hauser is the medium through which one understands the
genesis of hydroelectric development in Montana.

By viewing his successes
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and his failures, we can see the corporate entanglements that welded
the mining industry to electrical generation in the state.

Such a per

spective may help to illuminate not only the circumstances of industrial
development in Montana, but may explain the special relationship between
the state's mining industry and power suppliers.
Samuel T. Hauser came to Montana via steamboat on the Missouri
River in 1862.

After a thirty-five year career that included activities

in banking, ranching, land speculation and mining, he spent his last
years harnessing the river that carried him west.

CHAPTER I
A NEW POWER FOR MONTANA

Electricity was not a new phenomenon in late nineteenth-century
America.

Its value as a source of power was apparent to experimenters

and inventors as early as 1808.

Improvements in electrical producing

equipment and rapid advances in the promotion of the new energy source
caught the imagination of Americans in the late 1870s and characterized
the last two decades of the nineteenth century.

It was these same

achievements that attracted capital investment to the electrical industry
and encouraged the formation of new corporations.

In Montana, farmers

continued to break new sod and the American Indian held tenaciously to
the last vestiges of his nomadic culture.

In the midst of these transi

tions, frontier communities quickly followed the lead of their eastern
neighbors in establishing electrical plants.

Pioneer capitalists

turned their attentions from mining, lumbering and agriculture to the
new industry of electricity.
Electricity's first commercial developers in the United States
promoted its use in lighting.

Sir Humphrey Davy, in 1808, had dis

covered that by passing an electric current through two pieces of
carbon, he could produce light.

But not until 1876 did the American

inventor Charles F. Brush perfect this system of "arc-lighting" with
the introduction of a simplified arc lamp.

To supply power to this

lamp, Brush constructed a small "dynamo" which converted mechanical
5
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energy into electrical energy.

Brush marketed his generating machine

and arc light system in metropolitan areas of the United States during
the late 1870s, and, by the early 1880s, he had clearly demonstrated its
technical value J
While Brush continued his experiements in arc-lighting, another
American inventor, Thomas A. Edison, toyed with the idea of an incan
descent lighting system.

Edison realized that high voltage arc lights

were suitable for municipal lighting needs, but he believed that they
were ill-adapted to wider distribution in the American residential lighting market.

2

Production of a low voltage, incandescent lamp, operated

on a parallel rather than a series circuit, appeared to Edison to have
greater economic value than the arc lamp.

3

Edison and a team of engineers worked on the incandescent lighting
plan from 1879 to 1881.

In the fall of the later year, they were ready

to install their first unit in a New York City building.

The electric

lighting venture proved economically feasible and, by 1881, the newly1. Harold C. Passer, The Electrical Manufacturers, 1875-1900: A
Study in Competition, Entrepreneurship, Technical Change and Economic
Growth (New York: Arno Press, 1972), pp. 11-21, discusses the origins
and development of the electrical industry in America. This work is
particularly valuable for its insights into early corporate consolida
tion. Also see John Garraty, The New Commonwealth: 1877-1890, New
American Nation Series (New York: Harper and Row, 1968), p. 94.
2. Passer, The Electrical Manufacturers, pp. 79-80. U.S. Depart
ment of Commerce and Labor, Bureau of the Census, Central Electric
Light and Power Stations, Special Reports, 1902 (Washington: 1905),
p. 86.
3. In a series circuit, a negative pole is connected to a positive
and vice versa. In parallel circuitry, positive poles are connected
together and negative poles are connected together. In practical terms,
parallel circuitry delivers a greater current from a lower voltage source
than does series circuitry.
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created Edison Electric Light Company served eighty-five commercial
4
customers in metropolitan New York.
The success of incandescent lighting soon was apparent to the
American public, and the demand for Edison's product increased dra
matically during the 1880s.
capital investment.

An expanding market created a need for

Many inventors, including Edison, Brush, and Elihu

Thomson, secured financing from interested businessmen and established
various firms during this early phase of electrical development.

The

lighting industry captured the imagination of Americans during the
1880s, but high development costs forced inventors to find more specula
tive forms of monetary support.
While noted investors J. P. Morgan and Henry Villard were instru
mental in funding the nation's first electrical companies, other, less
moneyed, individuals, also entered the business.

Charles A. Coffin,

a Lynn, Massachusetts businessman, was typical of the entrepreneurs who
entered the new industry during its infancy.

Coffin and a small group

of Lynn speculators purchased the American Light Company (holders of
Elihu Thomson's patent for an arc-lighting system) in 1882.

Reincor

porating the company under the name Thomson-Houston Electric Company,
Coffin and his associates established a manufacturing plant in Lynn
in 1883.5
Coffin originally functioned as the firm's salesman and corporate
manager, while Thomson concentrated on perfecting new designs.
4. Passer, The Electrical Manufacturers, pp. 86, 90; Garraty,
The New Commonwealth, p. 94.
5.

Ibid., p. 26.
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Throughout the 1880s, Coffin focused his attention on consolidating the
proliferating electrical industry.

As one twentieth-century historian

explains, "Charles Coffin was the entrepreneur in the arc-lighting
equipment industry who understood the importance of acquiring other
firms and who had the necessary financial resources."6

Between 1883 and

1890, the Thomson-Houston Company acquired the assets of a number of
small metropolitan lighting companies.

Most of these transactions were

accomplished through mergers that were beneficial to both parties.

By

1890, the Thomson-Houston Electric Company was a leader in the elec
trical industry, and, when the company reorganized as the General
Electric Company in 1892, Charles Coffin was selected to head the new
7
firm.
Westinghouse Electric Company shared the leadership of the elec
trical industry with the General Electric Company in 1892.

George

Westinghouse, a man with little formal education, rose to prominence
as an inventor when he produced the first railroad air brake in 1869.
His interest and success in developing mechanical devices for the rail
road industry introduced Westinghouse to the rapid advances in the field
of electric power production.

Westinghouse avoided duplication in the

area of electrical lighting by concentrating on applying electricity to
industrial use.

The adaptation required an efficient method for trans

mitting the power, and the new use for electricity forced Westinghouse
g
to focus on alternating rather than direct current.
Success in this
6.

Ibid., p. 52.

7.

Ibid., pp. 52-57, passim.

8. Direct current is current that flows in only one direction,
from negative to positive. It can be reversed only by changing the
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endeavor rested on the inventor's ability to develop a method to
"transform" high voltage alternating current into lower, consumptive
voltages.
The Westinghouse Electric Company was formed in January, 1886, to
finance experiments in alternating current.

By March of that year,

William Stanley of that company was ready to demonstrate an alternating
current transmission system.

Tests proved successful and Westinghouse

proceeded, in 1886, to install the country's first commercial alternat
ing current lighting system.

By 1891, he had not only perfected the

transmission system but had constructed an alternating current electric
g
motor for use in a mine at Telluride, Colorado.
The work of George
Westinghouse and his associates markedly advanced the course of the
electrical industry by providing a method of transmitting electricity
from a power source to distant markets and by demonstrating the applica
bility of electrical power to industrial use.^
The promotional and technical efforts of the Westinghouse and the
General Electric Company (successor to the Thomson-Houston Company)
polarity at the source. Alternating current, which is produced by
generators, changes direction regularly without physically reversing
the polarity at the source. By using alternating rather than direct
current, Westinghouse could employ a generator to create high-voltage
electricity which could then be transmitted to distant power stations.
See Arthur A. Bright, Jr., The Electric-Lamp Industry: Technological
Change and Economic Development From 1800 To 1947 (New York: Arno Press,
1972), pp. 98-99.
9.
10.

Passer, The Electrical Manufacturers, pp. 136-68, 279-80.
Garraty, The New Commonwealth, p. 96.
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transformed America's commercial power system.

Development of alternat

ing and direct current lighting facilities forced the nation's coal, coke
and gas companies to accept the superiority of electric light over that
supplied by gas.

Increasingly in the 1880s, local city gas companies

purchased the rights to distribute electric light and power, while they
relegated gas consumption to home and office heating.^

Similarly, the

adaptation of electricity to industrial motors forced manufacturers
to recognize the benefits of converting to the new source of power.
The emergence of electric power for lighting and manufacturing on
America's eastern shore was followed quickly by the same phenomena in
Montana.

Though still a frontier with much of its land uncharted in

1880, Montana Territory received the benefits of electric arc and
incandescent lights in step with much of the nation.

Such early recep

tivity to electricity in Montana was one factor that encouraged local
businessmen to enter this field of enterprise.
The mining community of Butte was one of the earliest Montana
communities to receive electric light.

C. C. Ruthrauff of the Brush

Electric Light Company installed a small, steam-driven dynamo and four
teen lights at the Alice Mine in 1880.

The successful operation of

this new source of illumination encouraged the incorporation of Butte's
12
Brush Electric Light and Power Company in 1882.
Eight years later,
11. Passer, The Electrical Manufacturers, pp. 195-203, passim.
Also see Bureau of the Census, Central Electric Light and Power
Stations, p. 15.
12. The Montana Power Company, "The Story of Montana Power" (n.p.,
n.d.), pp. 8-9. Also see Douglas F. Leighton's "The Corporate History
of the Montana Power Company: 1882-1913," unpublished M.A. Thesis,
Montana State University (Missoula: 1950), p. 8.
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the electrical industry in Butte expanded when investors formed the
Butte General Electric Company.

This new firm consolidated the elec

trical plants and interests of the Silver Bow Electric Light and Power
Company, the Brush Electric Light and Power Company, and William A.
Clark's recently organized Butte Electric Light and Power Company.

13

Despite a separation of more than 2,000 miles, Montana mimicked its
eastern neighbors, by applying electricity to street and commerical
lighting.

The town of Helena soon challenged Butte's lead in this field.

In 1883, E. W. Knight, H. M. Parchen, and T. H. Kleinschmidt formed the
Helena Light and Power Company and introduced arc lighting to that
community.

This firm operated a steam-powered Brush dynamo to fulfill
14
a contract to the city of Helena for street lighting.
In 1889, the
Citizens Electric Light Company, which sported the competing ThomsonHouston lighting system, joined the Helena Light and Power Company in
15
supplying electric service to the community.
During the late 1880s and the early 1890s, the citizens of Helena
received further benefits from electricity when the City Council approved
a plan to electrify the community's street railway.^6

13.
p. 10.

Encouraged by the

Leighton, "The Corporate History of the Montana Power Company,"

14. Michael Leeson, History of Montana (Chicago: 1885), p. 734.
Also see Helena Illustrated: A History of the Early Settlement and the
Helena of Today (Helena: Frank L. Thresher, Publisher, 1890), pp. tz-13.
15.

Helena Illustrated, pp. 12-13.

16. For a thorough history of the Street railway system in Helena,
see Rex Myers, "A History of the Street Railways in Helena, Montana
(1883-1927)," unpublished M.A. Thesis, University of Montana (Missoula:
1970), pp. 33-37.
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production of improved electric motors, noted Montana and ardent Helena
promoter C. A. Broadwater organized the Helena Electric Railway Company
in March, 1890.

In May of that year, Broadwaterls street railway line

began operation of the first electric railway in the city.^
The success of pioneer electric lighting and power companies and
the trend towards consolidation of those same firms were as evident in
Helena as they were in Butte.

By 1894, the newly-formed Helena Power

and Light Company had assumed the interests of the Helena Gas Light and
Coke Company, the Helena Electric Company, and two street railway lines.
Production of the new power source did not remain solely with
Helena or Butte.

Great Falls was a third Montana city to enjoy the

benefits of supporting the new electric industry.

A relatively new

community, Great Falls was founded in 1888 by Paris Gibson, who saw the
town as a terminal for the Great Northern Railway Company's trans
continental railroad.

Gibson located the townsite astride the Missouri

River at a site blessed with water power.

Gibson recognized the

potential for power generation that existed in the Missouri's cascades
at Great Falls.
In magnitude the Falls of the Missouri are unsurpassed
in the United States except by the falls of the Niagara.
The power available here at the medium flow is ten times
greater than that of the Mississippi river at Minnea
polis, and thirty times that of either Lowell, Lawrence,
Holyoke or Lewiston. ... It is estimated if all the
power at Niagara could be harnessed, it would yield
power at 1,000,000 horse power, while the available
17.

Ibid., p. 42.

18. T. H. Kleinschmidt, H. M. Parchen and Anton Holter were the
incorporators of this company. Myers, "A History of the Street
Railways in Helena," p. 54.

18
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power at the Falls of the Missouri is placed at 350,000
horse power at a medium low stage of waterJ9
Gibson's claim of the power available from the great falls of the
Missouri River was not unwarranted and soon was justified by one of the
first attempts in Montana to harness water power for electrical use.
In 1887, Paris Gibson formed the Great Falls Water Power and Townsite Company and purchased all of the available water power sites at the
great falls of the Missouri from railroad magnate James J. Hill.

20

Two years later, the company entered into an agreement with the BostonMontana Consolidated Copper and Silver Mining Company (later the BostonMontana Copper Smelting and Refining Company) to supply power to that
company's new smelter and electric plant at Great Falls.

In 1891,

Gibson's firm completed construction of Black Eagle Dam and began delivering
energy to the smelter's plant by means of a rope transmission.

Two

1,000 foot long hemp ropes supplied mechanical power to direct current
Thomson-Houston generators that ran the Boston-Montana Company's
smelters, concentrator, and electric lights.

21

The city of Great Falls

maintained the lead in exploring the possibiliities of water power when,
in 1891, it replaced a steam electric generating plant with one powered
by water .

22
u

19. Paris Gibson, "The Falls of the Missouri—Their Past, Present,
and Future," Rocky Mountain Magazine: An Illustrated Monthly. Vol. 1
(September 1900), p. 25.
20.

The Montana Power Company, "The Story of Montana Power," p. 15.

21.

Ibid., p. 16.

22.

Ibid., p. 17.
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Establishment of light and power facilities at Great F&lls, Helena,
and Butte fostered investment in the electrical industry.

The reception

accorded electricity, first in commercial lighting and later in industrial
plants at Great Falls, encouraged Montana businessmen to keep abreast of
further developments in the field.

As their collective interest was

aroused, Montana capitalists began investigating the suitability of numerous
water power sites.

They were aided in this search by the national

approach to utilizing this natural resource.
During the mid-1880s, Congress began assuming its jurisdiction over
dams in navigable rivers.

Provisions of the first legislation on the

subject, the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1884, required the Secretary of
War to report the location of navigation obstructions, including dams,
to Congress.

The Rivers and Harbors Acts of 1890 and 1899 extended con

gressional authority in this area by requiring each new dam to receive
specific approval from the federal legislative body.

Both of these laws

were restricted, however, in that they only applied to dams that were
situated in navigable waterways.

Dams that were located on the public

domain, but not on navigable rivers, and those that lay wholly within
the boundaries of state or private lands, were not subject to federal
23
supervision.
As a result of this liberal federal policy, it was not difficult
for Montana water power promoters to secure approval for dams on the
23. For a good discussion of early water-power legislation, see
Jerome G. Kerwin's Federal Water-Power Legislation, Studies in History,
Economics, and Public Law NO. z/4 (New YorK: uoiumoia University Press,
1926), passim. For a view of early federal water legislation and other
conservation issues, see Samuel P. Hays, Conservation and the Gospel
of Efficiency: The Progressive Conservation Movement, 1890-1920
(New York: Atheneum, 1972), passim.
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Missouri River above the great falls.

While there had been repeated

attempts during the 1870s and 1880s to develop navigation on this upper
stretch of the river, the U.S. Arniy Corps of Engineers considered the
truly navigable section of the Missouri to be downstream from Fort
Benton.

24

A Montana dam developer simply needed to acquire the appro

priate water rights and lan<t and to make his application to Congress.
There was no time limit for either beginning or for completing con
struction of the dam, and there was no charge for the privilege of
occupying a navigable waterway.

A perceptive speculator could easily

secure the river's available power sites in expectation of future
development.
After 1900, an increased number of reauests to construct dams forced
Congress to address the water power question directly.

In June, 1906,

Congressional members passed the General Dam Act in an attempt to
establish uniform rules and procedures for future dam applications.

The

salient provisions of the 1906 legislation were the requirements that
1) dam plans and specifications be approved by the Chief of Engineers
and the Secretary of War, 2) the grantee provide locks and navigational
24. Between 1876 and 1899, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers con
ducted a number of improvement projects on the Missouri River above
Fort Benton, Montana. Most of the projects involved the construction
of wing dams, the removal of snags, and bank improvements. The con
struction of railroads along the Missouri during the later 1880s
dampened the federal government's enthusiasm for developing the upper
reaches of the river for navigation. Competition from dam promoters
added to the Corps' reluctance to improve the river. After 1899, the
federal government took no further measures to improve the Missouri
above Fort Benton. For more information on this development, see
Alan Newell and Gary Williams, "Missouri River Navigation Study:
Loma, Montana, to Three Forks, Montana," unpublished manuscript pre
pared for the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Omaha District,
August 12, 1974.

16
aids, 3) construction start within one year and be finished within
three years.

As in previous water-related statutes, the General Dam

Act did not apply to non-navigable waters in the public domain.
Furthermore, the 1906 act stipulated no time limit for the grant's
duration and it authorized no federal charge for use of a federally
controlled river.

Despite these limitations, Congressional leaders

hoped that the General Dam Act of 1906 would allow them to exert control
over the nation's increasing hydroelectric development, while reducing
the amount of time they had to expend on individual dam requests.

25

The issue of dam construction on navigable rivers was but one of
the many resource conservation issues that faced policy makers at the
turn of the century.

Still, it was an issue that involved the nation's

leading advocates of federal control of natural resources (Gifford
Pinchot, James Garfield, Frederick Newell), and it was a matter that
became entangled in the political machinations of the period.

26

National conflicts over conservation problems delayed initiation of a
clear federal water power policy until 1920.

The Water Power Act of

that year placed time restrictions on grants for dam construction and
25. Kerwin, Federal Water-Power Legislation, p. 112; Hays,
Conservation and the Gospel of Efficiency, p. 115.
26. The question of water-power development of the nation's rivers
involved various views of the nature of the public domain. Under the
leadership of Gifford Pinchot, federal policy makers developed a permit
system whereby power companies were regulated in their construction of
dams on National Forest lands. The attempt to shift this policy to all
public lands was thwarted when Richard A. Ballinger replaced James
Garfield as Secretary of the Interior in 1908. Not until the Water
Power Act of 1920 did the Pinchot principle of permitting hydroelectric,
companies extend to all public lands. Hays, Conservation and the Gospel
of Efficiency, pp. 73-81.

17
authorized the federal government to charge a rent for the use of
navigable rivers.

This new legislation emphasized that Congress viewed

the act of operating a privately owned dam, affecting public resources,
27
as a privilege and not a right.
Federal inability to anticipate the rapidity with which the hydro
electric industry developed offered Montana promoters an opportunity to
secure valuable water power sites for nominal costs.

Combined with the

Montana public's receptivity to electricity, this lack of an adequate
public policy invited investors to enter the electrical power business
in Montana.
A third factor that prompted Montanans to invest in electrical
generation was the adaptability of electricity to the mining industry.
The mining and smelting of various ores represented Montana's major
form of industrialization during the last two decades of the nineteenth
century.

While silver, lead, and gold were important state resources,

it was the rapid expansion of the copper industry that thrust Montana
into a leading position in the mineral producing community.
The cities of Butte and Anaconda were the sites for most of the
state's important copper smelters.

The Butte and Boston Company,

William A. Clark's Butte Reduction Works, the Colorado Smelting and
Mining Company, and the Parrot Silver and Copper Company owned mines and
smelters in the city of Butte during the 1880s.

Marcus Daly, driven by

a shortage of water on the Butte Hill, located his famous Anaconda
27.
p. 239.

Ibid., p. 80, and Kerwin, Federal Water-Power Legislation,
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smelters in the city of the same name in 1884 and 1887.

28

Operation of the mining and smelting facilities in the mining center
of Butte/Anaconda required vast amounts of energy.

Steam, produced by

burning coal, coke, or charcoal, was the primary source of power during
the 1880s and 1890s.

While charcoal was readily available from the

forests of western Montana, the availability of coal and coke was more
restricted.

High quality coal was a scarce commodity in Montana during

these years, most of the resource being secured from mines at Sand Coulee
and Belt in Cascade County, and from the Bozeman, Livingston and Red
29
Lodge areas.
Acquisition and the cost of coal for steam plants was
a constant problem for smelting plants, and it may have been a major
reason for the Boston-Montana Copper and Smelting Company's locating
a smelter in Great Falls in 1889 near the Sand Coulee and Belt mines.
Development of both alternating and direct electric current motors
in the 1880s offered a potential solution to the industry's difficulties.
Installation of the electric motors at a Telluride, Colorado, mine in
1891 demonstrated that electricity could be used successfully for
28. For a discussion of the mine and smelter development at Butte
and Anaconda, see Historical Research Associates, "Preliminary Investi
gations, Historical Emissions Inventory, Montana Air Pollution Study,"
Montana Department of Health and Environmental Sciences, Air Quality
Bureau (Helena: June 1, 1978), passim.
29. Commercial development of coal mines in Montana began as early
as 1867, when Colonel James D. Chestnut located a small mine on the
divide separating Bozeman from Livingston. During the 1890s, the
Northern Pacific Railway Company mined coal from a large formation
near Red Lodge. For a history of early coal mining in Montana,
see Rita McDonald's and Merrill G. Burlingame's "Montana's First
Commercial Coal Mine," Pacific Northwest Quarterly, Vol. 47, No. 1
(1956). Also see William tvans and Robert Peterson's "Decision at
Colstrip," Pacific Northwest Quarterly* Vol. 61, No. 3 (1970).
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powering hoisting, pump and haulage equipment.

In 1894, one mining

journal reported that electricity also was suited to "mine lighting and
to the explosion of blasting charges, while electrolytic treatment of
30
ores is a most important branch of metallurgical science."
Marcus
Daly exploited this latter use of electricity in his Anaconda Company
"Lower Works" smelter in 1894.

By 1896, the smelter was electrically

refining more than one-fourth of the monthly ore volume from the upper
31
and lower works.
Other mining journals also commented on the uses of
electricity in the mining industry.

By the mid-1890s, it was apparent

to most knowledgeable observers that electricity would soon replace
steam as the direct source of power in this important economic area.

32

While electricity's versatility gained increased recognition during
the 1890s, steam plants were still required to drive the dynamos that
produced the new-found energy.

Greater efficiency in a smelter or mine

dictated full utilization of electricity and less dependence on fossil
fuels.

George Westinghouse's experiments with the transmission of

alternating current helped lessen the reliance on coal and coke.

The

ability to transmit high voltage electricity great distances and to
reduce its strength through transformers revolutionized the power supply
30. Montana Mining and Marketing Reporter, Vol. I, No. 3 (October
6, 1894), p. 20. Also see Western Mining World, Vol. Ill, No. 49,
p. 88.
31. Historical Research Associates, "Preliminary Investigations,"
p. 53; Western Mining World, Vol. IV, No. 68, January 4, 1896, p. 1;
Ralph I. Smith, "History of the Early Reduction Plants of Butte, Montana,"
State of Montana, Bureau of Mines and Geology (reprinted from De Re
Metallica, Vol. 18, No. 2 and 3 [May, 1953], p. 13).
32. For example, see Western Mining World, Vol. Ill, No. 59
(November 2, 1895), p. 210.
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business.

Electrical energy could now be generated from a central

source and transmitted to a number of distribution centers.

The most

significant ramification of this discovery for Montana was the public
recognition of the increased potential for hydroelectric generation.
As early as 1890, engineers speculated on the importance of water
power and the transmission of electricity.

One analyst anticipated

locating a "steam plant by the water side, where compound condensing
engines can be used and where by concentration of stations, we can use
large engines with the greatest economy in coal consumption."

33

This

writer suggested that the location of a steam plant outside of the city
would remove an objectionable source of both noise and air pollution.
He also added that "these advantages, great as they are, are nothing
compared with the possibilities in the way of utilizing our water
powers.

..34

Montanans also recognized the future importance of the state's
water resource.

An enthusiastic engineer reported to a local meeting

of the Society of Engineers in 1895 that:
The electrical transmission for power is fast
bringing all the hitherto obscure water powers
of the world into commercial importance. The
day is not far distant when all the available
water power of the United States, in fact, the
world, will be utilized to its fullest capacity.
. . . Montana has extensive opportunities for
the development of water power within her
borders, and the next decade should show vast
33. Eugene Friggin, "The Electrical Transmission of Power,"
Association of Engineering Societies, Vol. 9, No. 9 (September, 1890),
pp. 430-31.
34.

Ibid.

21
strides along the lines of its development.

35

The cost of steam power versus water generated elecricity was
particularly important to early promoters of electrical expansion.
Noted civil engineer Max Hebgen claimed that steam power cost mining
companies approximately $125 to $200 per horsepower per year.

Elec

tricity, on the other hand, could be purchased consistently at $50 per
36
horsepower per annum, and it was available for as little as $35.
The susceptibility of Montana mining facilities to electrical
usage, especially in the Butte/Anaconda area, encouraged development of
electric generation.

The search for an abundant and cheap source of,

energy focused the mining industry's attention on the transmission of
electricity from central hydroelectric stations.

The example of the

Boston-Montana Company's electrically operated smelter in Great Falls
was not wasted on that firm's competitors.

It also was likely that

Montana's copper magnates recognized the increased demand for copper
wire that the nation's rapid electric development would require.

All

of these factors heightened Montana businessmen's awareness of the
eminent full electrification of the mining industry and the monetary
reward of such a technical renovation.
Historian Henry Adams commented on the new age of electricity after
venturing to the Paris Exposition in 1900.

Amid all the mechanical

35. M. S. Parker, "Cost of Steam and Water Power in Montana,"
Association of Engineering Societies, Vol. 15 (June 18, 1895), p. 26.
36. Max Hebgen, "Hydroelectric Development in Montana," Trans
actions of the American Institute of Mining Engineers. Vol. 46
(August, 1913) (New York: 1914), p. 804.
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inventions that were exhibited in the great hall, Adams was lured to the
display of dynamos.

Increasingly concerned with his own anachronism,

the Boston scholar pondered the significance of the colossal machines.
As he grew accustomed to the great gallery of
machines, he began to feel the forty-foot
dynamos as a moral force, much as the early
Christians felt the Cross. The planet itself
seemed less impressive, in its old-fashioned,
deliberate, annual or daily revolution, than
this huge wheel, revolving within arm's length
at some vertiginous speed, and barely murmur
ing—scarcely humming an audible warning to
stand a hair's-breadth further for respect of
power—while it would not wake the baby lying
close against its frame. Before the end, one
began to pray to it; inherited instinct taught
the natural expression of man before silent and
infinite force. Among the thousand symbols of
ultimate energy, the dynamo was not so human
as some, but it was the most impressive.3'
To Henry Adams, the dynamo and its ability to convert mechanical energy
into electrical energy graphically illustrated the public's fascination
with science and its head-long rush into the twentieth century.
Other Americans were equally impressed with this new form of
energy.

Men such as J. P. Morgan, Henry Villard, and Henry H. Rogers

saw in electricity the same economic potential that had propelled the
country to positions of leadership in other industries.

These indivi

duals thought electricity efficient and recognized that its generation
would result in a more productive and wealthy America.

Historian Howard

Mumford Jones explains that during this "age of energy, one can say
37. Henry Adams, The Education of Henry Adams (New York: The
Modern Library, 1931), p. 380.
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without being paradoxical that the vision of John D. Rockefeller, Sr.,
paralleled the vision of Walt Whitman—a picture of a happy, wasteless,
and plentiful society."^
Montana's industrial society had its own Rockefellers during the
1890s and early 1900s.

At the turn of the century, local capitalists

such as Anton Holter, William A. Clark, and Samuel T. Hauser held posi
tions of economic power and political influence.

These were men who had

arrived in the state during territorial days and had risen to prominence
largely through expansion in the mining industry.

They were at their

entrepreneurial zenith in the 1890s and they sought to retain that
standing.
Samuel T. Hauser is representative of this group of elderly capi
talists.

Having arrived in Montana before the land achieved territorial

status, Hauser quickly attained distinction on the western frontier.
A fervent promoter of Helena, Hauser shared his friends' interest in
bringing electricity to that community.

This prominent Montanan also

capitalized on federal indecision over water power development by taking
advantage of accessible Missouri River power sites near Helena.

Most

importantly, Hauser possessed the practical mining skills and necessary
experience to realize the inevitability of electrical application to the
mining industry.

He was one of the first Montana mining entrepreneurs

to utilize the new energy source in an industrial capacity.

The rapid

development of Hauser's facilities at three locations on the Missouri
38. Howard Mumford Jones, The Age of Energy: Varieties of American
Experience. 1865-1915 (New York: Viking Press, 1970).
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was predicated on his belief that mining and smelting operators would
soon turn to electric power.
In 1893, at the age of 60, S. T. Hauser began his efforts to develop
the hydroelectric potential of the Missouri River.

By the early 1900s,

he came into conflict with two other entrepreneurs, John D. Ryan and
Charles W. Uetmore, representing power interest in Great Falls and Butte,
respectively.

These men also understood the economics of selling elec

tricity to industrial clients and they turned their attentions to
challenging Hauser's plans for the Missouri.
Inevitably, S. T. Hauser was forced to do economic battle with
these two adversaries.

In the ensuring fight, Hauser suffered various

defeats—some of his own doing and some directed by fate.

In the end,

Hauser's inability to retain the support of Montana's largest industrial
consumer of electricity forced him to sell his Missouri River properties.
Events surrounding Samuel Hauser's involvement in electrical gener
ation offer a valuable perspective on the beginnings of the electric
industry in Montana.

While some Americans such as Henry Adams warily

eyed the coming years, an elderly S. T. Hauser plunged enthusiastically
into the new century.

The pioneer Montanan realized too late that he

did not command the financial resources to keep pace with the rapidly
consolidating electric industry.

CHAPTER II
S. T. HAUSER AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE MISSOURI RIVER DAMS, 1896-1908
"The Goose Hangs High"

Samuel Thomas Hauser arrived at Fort Benton (Montana) from St.
Louis, Missouri, in the spring of 1862.

Born in Falmouth, Kentucky on

January 10, 1833, Hauser had received his early education in civil
engineering.

He was working for a railroad company in Missouri when

the Civil War erupted in 1861.

At twenty -nine years of age, a strongly

pro-southern S. T. Hauser decided to abandon the strife-ridden border
state of Missouri and to seek his fortune in the WestJ
Hauser came to the Rocky Mountains destined for the gold mines of
the Salmon River.

After receiving favorable reports of the mineral

wealth of that region (Idaho), the young pioneer retreated from the
Bitterroot Mountains of western Montana and joined other prospectors
1. The two major sources of information on Samuel T. Hauser's
early years are John W. Hakola's "Samuel T. Hauser and the Economic
Development of Montana: A Case Study in Nineteenth-Century Capitalism"
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Indiana University, 1961), and the
Herbert Peet Collection, Montana State Historical Society (Helena),
Archives, MSS #89. Hakola's dissertation is far more useful than the
miscellaneous notes and typescripts of Peet. Nevertheless, Peet's
material is very good for information on Hauser's first two decades in
Montana, and Hakola relies heavily on this collection of documents.
Both Peet and Hakola end their respective examinations of Samuel
Hauser's career before 1893.
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at Gold Creek.

2

Later in 1862, Hauser journeyed from these diggings to

new riches located at Bannack, Montana.

In April of the following year

(1863), he accompanied a group of young miners led by James Stuart on
an ill-fated exploration of the Yellowstone Valley.
By the autumn of 1863, Samuel Hauser had been in Montana for little
over a year.

He was thirty years old and, even though he had barely

carved an economic niche for himself, the young miner had discovered
two important things.

He recognized that the immediate future of

Montana lay in the territory's mineral wealth, located primarily in
quartz lodes.

Hauser also realized that in order to erect facilities

and to buy machinery to exploit this natural resource, Montana entre
preneurs would have to look outside the state for investment capital.
For more than a year, 1863-1864, Hauser sojourned on the East Coast
3
in an attempt to promote economic and political interest in the West.
He returned to the East once again in 1865, this time to gather capital
for developing a quartz lode of silver in the Beaverhead Valley.

This

search fostered the organization of the Missouri Petroleum and Mining
Company in 1866.

The company, which featured numerous Missouri inves

tors, was soon renamed the St. Louis and Montana Mining Company.

As

historian John Hakola remarks, this firm was one
. . . which, with changes in name and structure,
lasted until the First World War, and in its long
2. Gold Creek is located approximately fifteen miles southeast of
Drummond, Montana. It was the site of the first reported gold discovery
in Montana in 1858. Hakola, "Samuel T. Hauser," pp. 14-20.
3. Hauser made his first bid for political appointment during this
trip to the East coast. As a staunch Democrat in a circle of Republicans,
his efforts were unsuccessful. Ibid., pp. 25-29.
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history presents in a microcosm the experiences of
silver mining in Montana from the initial discovery
and experimental stages to a final reworking of the
tailings and dumps and the extraction of a tempo
rarily more valuable mineral than silver.^
While Samuel Hauser was not influential in the St. Louis and Montana
Mining Company for all those years, his early involvement in the cor
poration demonstrated promotional abilities and undaunted optimism in
the future of the Montana territory.

5

It was his skill at garnering

outside money and foreseeing future economic trends in the region that
made S. T. Hauser such a powerful and successful man.

He exhibited his

business acumen in a number of financial ventures during the 1870s and
1880s.
Hauser was a strong supporter of railroad expansion into Montana
during the 1870s.

In 1873, he lobbied strongly for a territorial

subsidy for the Utah and Northern Railway Company's planned extension
from Utah to Montana.
4.

6

When that company decided to make Butte, and

Ibid., p. 37.

5. Hakola argues, pp. 72-73, that Hauser was always more the pro
moter of business than the shrewd manager. However, the evidence of
Hauser's participation in the hydroelectric business suggests that the
Montana capitalist's managerial abilities can be debated. Certainly,
Hauser's earlier economic ventures suffered from his mistakes. None
theless, his successes and failures in managing the hydroelectric
business must be qualified by the nature of his opposition. As will be
shown later, S. T. Hauser competed with a tremendous financial and
political power in his attempt to control hydroelectric development
in Montana. A man without S. T. Hauser's full range of business
abilities could not have succeeded to the degree that he did.
6. Clark C. Spence, Territorial Politics and Government in
Montana: 1864-1889 (Urbana, 111.: University of Illinois Press, 1975),
pp. 122-23.
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not Helena, its Montana terminus in 1880, Hauser quickly switched his
efforts toward promoting an east-west line for the Northern Pacific Rail
way Company.

Hauser 1 s ties to the Northern Pacific Company remained

strong throughout the 1880s and 1890s, and it was through this bond that
he was able to construct numerous branch lines to his various mining
facilities.^
S. T. Hauser's financial strength was based upon more than interest
or investments in railroads and silver mining. For thirty years (18661896), Hauser grounded all of his economic activities on his First
National Bank of Helena.

Hauser's bank, incorporated in 1866, was in

deed the first national bank established in Montana Territory.

Once

again, Hauser turned to St. Louis capital to fund this institution.

He

also enlisted the support of a number of Montanans in the ventureestablishing a pattern of combining local and outside money that he used
g
repeatedly in future enterprises.
The banking industry in Montana during the later decades of the
nineteenth century was linked intricately to mining.

Banks often re

ceived silver and gold ores from local mining operators, and shipped
the raw product to smelters in the eastern United States and Europe.

q

Mining ventures were speculative and a bank's lending policies had to be
7. Hakola, "Samuel T. Hauser," pp. 151-54. Hauser's ties to the
Northern Pacific Railway Company management remained strong through the
1890s.
8. Ibid., pp. 84-85. At various times in his career, S. T. Hauser
also was interested in irrigation and cattle ranching. He was one of
the partners in the famous DHS ranch.
9.

Ibid.
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liberal.

As the mining industry expanded and contracted during times

of economic crisis, so too did Hauser's First National Bank.

Indeed,

it was Hauser's use of bank finances that allowed him to engage in min
ing activities.

It was this same reliance on the First National's credit

that contributed to that institution's failure in the economic depression
of 1893-1896.
Hauser's early career in engineering is perhaps partly responsible
for his fascination with mining. In addition, his contacts through the
First National Bank undoubtedly introduced him to the enormous profit
available in this fledgling enterprise.

During his first years in

Montana, Hauser promoted the silver mining industry in Montana when he
sponsored construction of a smelter near Argenta in Beaverhead County
(1866).

This premature effort failed in 1867.

Undaunted, Hauser led

his St. Louis and Montana Mining Company directors into investments in
mines near Philipsburg.

It took more than ten years of production to

realize large gains from the Philipsburg properties, and Hauser received
few of the profits.

Nevertheless, the Montanan's faith in the silver

mining industry never waned.^
Ownership of the First National Bank of Helena introduced Hauser
to other mining properties in the 1870s and 1880s.

The more profitable

real estate was the Alta and Comet mines at Alta, Montana (in the
Boulder River Valley south of Helena) and the Montana Company smelting

10. Hauser decided to sell his stock in the mining company in the
1870s, at the very time that it was beginning to increase in value.
His other investments may have necessitated his making this financial
move.
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plant at Wickes.

Hauser assumed control of this property in 1879 when

the Montana Company's president, William Wickes, defaulted on loans to
the First National Bank of Helena.^

Hauser reorganized the company,

but the mines and smelters continued to lose money.

In 1882, Wickes

resigned as president and Hauser and Daniel C. Corbin assumed full con
trol.

The men formed the Helena Mining and Reduction Company, and

added an old friend, Anton Holter, and his bank's cashier, T. H.
12
Kleinschmidt, as directors.
Despite the reorganization efforts and the construction of a branch
line of the Northern Pacific Railway Company to Wickes in 1883, the
Helena Mining and Reduction Company failed to return substantial profits.
In an attempt to raise profits and to meet growing competition from a
competing silver smelting company, Hauser once again reorganized the
Helena Mining Company in 1888.

The new corporation, the Helena and

Livingston Smelting and Reduction Company, became a holding company for
Hauser's Livingston Coke and Coal Company, the Gregory Consolidated
Mining Company and the Helena Mining and Reduction Company.

That same

year, Hauser's Helena and Livingston Company opened a new smelter in
13
East Helena.
Fierce competition in the silver smelting industry forced
the Helena and Livingston Company to sell its new plant to the recently
11. Hakola, "Samuel T. Hauser," p. 258.
September 21, 1895, Vol. 3, No. 53, p. 138.

Western Mining World,

12. T. H. Klenschmidt also was the cashier for Hauser's First
National Bank of Helena.
13. Hakola, "Samuel T. Hauser," pp. 293-94. See also Western
Mining World, September 21, 1895, Vol. 3, No. 53, p. 138.
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formed United Smelting and Refining Company in 1890.

From that date

to 1899, Hauser's Helena and Livingston Company retained forty percent
14
interest in the United States Smelting and Refining Company.
Samuel T. Hauser's involvement in a wide variety of economic enter
prises brought him renown as one of the state's ablest business pro
moters.

Similarly, his economic life was tied to political aspirations.

Hauser, a lifelong Democrat, had been instrumental in gaining territorial
status for Montana in 1864.

As a friend of the influential Missouri

Senator George Vest, Hauser had standing in the national Democratic
Party.

15

His ability to wield political influence in Montana resulted

in President Cleveland's appointing him Territorial Governor in 1885.
S. T. Hauser was at his political and economic peak in 1890.
With an active interest in Montana's railroads, mines and smelters, he
entered the last decade of the nineteenth century with confidence.

The

first few years of that decade, however, presented the country, Montana,
and an optimistic Samuel Hauser with serious economic reversals.
nomic panic and depression visited the nation in 1893.

Eco

As confidence

in the country's financial well-being deteriorated, lending institutions
began to retrench and to demand their outstanding loans.
14. In 1899, the East Helena smelter became the property of the
American Smelting and Refining Company, the newly formed successor to
the United Smelting and Refining Company. Letter, S. T. Hauser to
I. Eilers, August 30, 1894, Montana State Historical Society (Helena),
Archives, MSS #37, Samuel T. Hauser Papers, Box 32, folder 31. Here
after cited as HP. See also Western Mining World, September 7, 1895,
Vol. 3, No. 51, and Letters, S. T. Hauser to A. D. Lynch, April 20 and
December 9, 1899, HP, Box 33, folder 2. The money gained from the sale
of the smelter was used to repay the debts of the First National Bank
of Helena.
15.

Spence, Territorial Politics, pp. 159-60.
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Hauser's First National Bank of Helena was one of the many western
banks that was summoned to repay its heavy indebtedness.

The Helena

Bank was unable to secure the necessary cash to send east and, amidst
bank failures throughout the country, closed its doors in July, 1893.^
A federal examiner, charged with overseeing Hauser's operation of the
bank, required the Helena businessman to find a majority of the bank's
customers who would agree not to demand payment for at least twelve
months.

Hauser solicited aid from one of the bank's largest stock

holders, E. L. Bonner of Missoula, claiming that, "It does not seem
possible that my own friends are going to refuse to do what over four
thousand people have already given their agreement to do."^

To another

friend, James A. Talbot of Butte, Hauser invoked memories of past support
in Judge A. J. Davis' political battles.

Hauser argued that if Talbot

and Davis could back him in his efforts to reopen the First National,
". . . it would enable us to save ourselves from very serious losses;
and, once opened, I have no doubt that I could get someone to purchase
the estate stock, or at least assume the responsibility of owning it
on some terms.

..18

These efforts, combined with Hauser's ability to secure personal
loans from corporate executives, allowed the First National Bank of
16. Letter, S. T. Hauser to George A. Baker, December 25, 1893,
HP, Box 32, folder 30.
17. Letter, S. T. Hauser to E. L. Bonner, December 2, 1893, HP,
Box 32, folder 30.
18. Letter, S. T. Hauser to James A. Talbot, September 6, 1893,
HP, Box 32, folder 30.
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Helena to reopen between 1894 and 1896.

The bank floundered once again
19
in 1896 and it was forced to close its doors permanently.
Samuel Hauser's financial difficulties in the 1890s were aggravated
in another way by the national depression.

The federal government's

large purchases of silver, required by the Silver Purchase Act of 1890,
merely reinforced a failing industry.

In the wake of the Panic of 1893,

newly-elected Democratic President Grover Cleveland initiated action to
have Congress repeal the Act of 1890.

Hauser commenced a letter writing

campaign in the late summer of 1893 in a futile effort to win support
for bimetal ism.

Writing to Maryland Senator A. P. Gorman, Hauser claimed

that:
Our state produces from forty to fifty million
dollars in value of metals, copper, silver, lead
and gold; and our population is only about one
hundred and fifty thousand; this you see would
be from three to four hundred dollars per capita
for our entire population. Destroying the money
function of silver would absolutely destroy fourfifths of this entire product. Being a practical
man you can readily see what a large percentage
of our people depend upon this industry for a
living, certainly nine-tenths of them. Conse
quently we not only have financial distress,
and men who are worth hundreds of thousands of
19. Hauser solicited a number of personal loans to cover bank and
mining debts. In one case, he asked for a re-discount of a personal
note in order not to report the prohibited transaction to the bank's
examiner. By 1899, Hauser was endorser for more than $300,000 of the
First National's debts. Letters, S. T. Hauser to George A. Baker,
December 25, 1893, HP, Box 32, folder 30; S. T. Hauser to President,
Shoe and Leather National Bank, September 1, 1894, HP, Box 32, folder 31;
S. T. Hauser to A. D. Lynch, December 9, 1899, HP, Box 33, folder 2;
S. T. Hauser to Messrs. Lynch, Willson and Brown, May 31, 1893, HP,
Box 32, folder 34; A. M. Holter to S. T. Hauser, February 13, 1899, HP,
Box 26, folder 26; Hauser to Sen. George G. Vest, August 12, 1893, HP,
Box 32, folder 30.

34

dollars are today paupers, but there will be
very considerable amount of actual starvation.

0

Hauser clearly exaggerated his claim of impoverishment for nine-tenths
of the state's population.

Nevertheless, the damage to his own financial

assets from repeal of the Sherman Silver Purchase Act was dramatic.
In August, 1893, Hauser wrote to Pennsylvania Senator J. D. Cameron
explaining that the summer's financial panic and the threat of repeal
of the Sherman Act had already forced many individuals (including Anton
21
Holter) to assign much of their property.
Writing to Anaconda copper
magnate Marcus Daly a day later, Hauser argued that:
Of course the success of silver is not so important
to you as it is to me. Destroying silver would
certainly be fatal to all of my interests, hence
I am very anxious to do all that is possible, and
believe that you will."
Despite these entreaties to Daly and to old political allies in Washing
ton, Hauser was unable to prevent unconditional repeal of the Sherman
Silver Purchase Act.

The nation's adoption of a single gold standard
23
for currency in 1894 exacerbated Hauser's financial disaster.
20. Letter, S. T. Hauser to Sen. A. P. Gorman, September 6, 1893,
HP, Box 32, folder 30.
21. Letter, S. T. Hauser to Sen. J. D. Cameron, August 23, 1893,
HP, Box 32, folder 20.
22. Letter, S. T. Hauser to Marcus Daly, August 24, 1893, HP,
Box 32, folder 30.

23. In a letter to old Missouri friend Senator George G. Vest,
Hauser explained that three " . . . mining companies alone were paying
into the bank about one hundred thousand dollars per month." Letter,
S. T. Hauser to Sen. George G. Vest, August 12, 1893, HP, Box 32,
folder 30.
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The economic reversals that Samuel Hauser faced in 1893 would have
caused many men to abandon hope of recouping their losses.

Instead

Hauser, as Montana's premiere promoter, sought new challenges in the wake
of past failures.

With a bank under examination and heavy investment in

a depressed silver market, the indomitable entrepreneurj>repared to enter
the new field of electrical production.
Hauser first became interested in electricity during the latf"T880s.
Always concerned about the scant supply and high cost of coal, he signed
a contract with the Thomson-Houston Company to erect an electric generat
ing plant at his Alta mine in 1889.

The mine and concentrator at Corbin

were two of the first such Montana operations to sport not only electric
24
lights, but an electric tram and mine hoist.
Hauser also considered
using water power to generate electricity to other mining operations.
Between 1890 and 1892, his Spokane Farm Company considered producing
electricity from a dam on McClellan Creek, southeast of Helena.

Hauser

planned to transmit this hydroelectricity to the United Smelting and
25
Refining Company's plant at East Helena,
but the Panic of 1893 cur
tailed development in this area.

Nevertheless, Hauser optimistically

remarked to Henry Seligman, a director of his Helena and Livingston
Smelting and Reduction Company:
We will undoubtedly put the water power in if
it becomes evident that the works [US&R Co.
24. Hauser's concern for a reliable fuel supply caused him to
organize the Livingston Coke and Coal Company. Hakola, "Samuel T.
Hauser," pp. 283-85, 300.
25.

Ibid., pp. 211-12.
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smelter] will continue to run, which I am sure
they will do. *6
Little more than two years after the disastrous summer of 1893, Samuel
Hauser rekindled his plans to apply electricity to the mining industry
around Helena.
Hauser's initial plans for electrification were two-fold.

He first

intended to establish an electrical plant at the Peck-Montana Company
concentrating mill at Corbin, Montana.

Hauser estimated that this proj

ect would require a small electric plant, primarily used to drive the
Peck concentrator.

Another more ambitious scheme was to organize a

water power company, which, after constructing a large hydroelectric
facility on the Missouri River, would sell power to the smelting and
refining plant at East Helena.
The Peck-Montana Company erected an experimental concentrating
plant at Corbin in the early 1890s.

Investors hoped that the facility

would demonstrate the feasibility of using the Peck machine on silver
27
ore tailings.
Both Hauser and hardware salesman Anton Holter invested
in the Peck-Montana Company.

Initial attempts at working the old Alta

mine tailings proved costly, but Hauser estimated that adding another
machine to the company's experimental facilitiy would eventually make
26. Letter, S. T. Hauser to Henry Seligman, August 31, 1893, HP,
Box 32, folder 30.
27. The Peck Concentrator, designed by 0. B. Peck, was cone shaped
and operated on the principle of centrifugal force. Crushed ore pulp
was fed into the smaller end of the machine and rotated at 600 to 800
r.p.m. This action forced cleaned concentrates from the larger end.
Hauser believed that the efficiency of this machine made it particularly
suitable for working a profit from old talings. See The Engineering and
Mining Journal, March 31, 1900, pp. 375-76.
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the venture profitable.

He expected the monetary return to be substantial

if the new plant were equipped with electric motors.

Hauser reasoned

that if electricity were applied to four machines at the Peck-Montana
works, the power would cost only $139 per day as opposed to $227 per day
28
with direct steam power cost.
Hauser implemented his plan to provide water-power generated elec
tricity to the new Peck Company plant in March, 1896.

Having secured

the necessary water rights on Prickly Pear Creek near the Corbin mill for
$3,000, he contracted with W. J. Chalmers of Chicago for the necessary
29
water power machinery and pipe for the hydroelectric facility.
Con
tracts stipulated that construction of the new plant was to be completed
by July, 1896.

Inexplicable delays in the delivery -of equipment prevented

the plant from starting operation until November of that year.

Once in

production, however, the new electrically driven Peck concentrator proved
30
satisfactory to Hauser and to his associates.
S. T. Hauser initiated his second venture during that spring of
1896.

He proposed to United Smelting and Refining Company executives

that they enter into a joint venture with the Peck-Montana Company and
the Helena Electric Railway and Light Company to construct a dam across
28. Letter, S. T. Hauser to Henry Seligman, March 4, 1896, HP,
Box 32, folder 33, and Agreement, Peck-Montana Co. and S. T. Hauser,
March 30, 1896, HP, Box 25, folder 4.
29. Letter, S. T. Hauser to Henry Seligman, March 4, 1896, HP,
Box 32, folder 33.
30. Letters, S. T. Hauser to W. J. Chalmers, August 5, 1896, and
S. T. Hauser to Henry Seligman, November 18, 1896, HP Letterpress Books,
Box 36, December 13, 1898-January 20, 1901.

the Missouri River at Canyon Ferry, approximately twelve miles north
east of Helena.

New York financier

Abram S. Hewitt's United Smelting

and Refining Company would be required to advance the majority capital
in return for a guaranteed cheap source of power and a substantial in
terest in the power company.

In addition, Hauser proposed that the

Peck-Montana Company erect a new concentrating plant adjacent to United
Smelting Company's smelter in East Helena.

Hauser reasoned that the

Peck machine's demonstrated ability to work tailings at the Corbin
plant would allow him to contract for silver tailings from the Rimini
District.

He anticipated that the application of cheap electric hydro

electric power to the smelter and concentrator would insure a substan31
tial profit from both companies.
In April, 1896, Hauser and representatives of the Hewitt interests
formulated plans for the hydro-powered installation.

The parties agreed

that the new dam would produce 4,000 horsepower upon completion; its
eventual capacity was anticipated to be 6,000 horsepower.

Most of the

available current was destined for the United Smelting and Refining
Company's smelter in East Helena, but sufficient quantities were to be
reserved for the operation of the Peck-Montana's new concentrator.

The

remainder of the electric power was scheduled for transmission to the
city of Helena for use in the city's electric works, and to the
31. Hauser's initial experiements with electricity proved expen
sive. Nevertheless, he believed that the suitability of that power
source to the Peck Concentrator would be demonstrated eventually.
Letter, S. T. Hauser to Henry Seligman, November 18, 1896, HP Letter
press Books, Box 36, December 13, 1898-January 20, 1901.

Peck-Montana Company plant at Corbin.
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The Helena Water and Electric Power Company, incorporated in May,
1896, reflected the interests of the respective mining firms.

S. T.

Hauser and Henry Seligman, of the Peck-Montana and Helena and Livingston
Companies, and Abram Hewitt, W. S. Gurnee and Barton Sewell, of the
United Smelting and Refining Company, formed the new power company's
33
directorate.
During the sunnier of that year, the Helena Water and
Electric Power Company applied to the Secretary of War for a permit to
construct a dam at Black Rock Canyon (Canyon Ferry) on the Missouri
River.

The Secretary replied that, "It is understood by the Department

that the river at the point is not navigable in fact," and authorized
the Montana company to erect its obstruction in the river.^
By the end of 1896, S. T. Hauser had not only the Secretary of
War's approval for a dam on the Missouri River, but enough funds to construct the dam and to erect the concentrator in East Helena.
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The

32. "Prospectus for Company," April 29, 1896, HP, Box 62, folder
42; "Agreement," 1896, HP, Box 63, folder 1; letter, S. T. Hauser to
James H. Eckels, December 30, 1896, HP, Box 32, folder 33. The PeckMontana Company was to give a rebate on ores to the United Smelting and
Refining Company. Letter, 0. B. Peck to S. T. Hauser, June 13, 1896.
33. "Prospectus," April 29, 1896, and Carl M. Westby, Jr., "Canyon
Ferry: Placer Gold to Power Dam" (unpublished M.A. thesis, Missoula,
Montana: Montana State University, 1954), p. 146.
34. Letter, Secretary of War Abram S. Hewitt. September 18, 1896,
Montana State Historical Society (Helena), Archives, MSS #13, Federal
Power Commission Records, Box 4, folder 6. Hereafter cited as FPC.
35. Letter, S. T. Hauser to James H. Eckels, December 30, 1896,
HP, Box 32, folder 33.

40

financial failure of 1893 seemed remote and the future appeared full of
promise.
In February of the following year, however, Hauser encountered
difficulties with the United Smelting and Refining Company's executives
at the Helena smelter.

Plant manager W. H. Aldridge disputed Hauser's

estimate of the profitability of a Peck machine at East Helena, claiming
that the Corbin Plant was not nearly as successful as the ex-Governor
represented it to be.

Since Hauser needed money from the United Smelt

ing Company to finance this new plant, Aldridge urged his corporate
bosses to consider seriously the benefits of the Peck machine.
There are any number of good men whose report may
be relied on, and who can examine and determine
once and for all, whether this machine is a success
or not. If it is not, and the plant at East Helena
is likely to be a failure, Mr. Gurnee should cer
tainly be made aware of this, and the United Company
withdraw its support and encouragement. It is wrong
for the Company or for Mr. Gurnee to advance money
for any enterprise which it starts in by believing
it to be a fake. There are enough monuments of
Gov. Hauser's folly in this country now. without
putting up another one at East Helena.3d
Aldridge explained that Hauser was always enthusiastic in promoting
ventures similar to the one then under consideration.

He cautioned that

none of the Hauser people should be relied upon to give a true represen37
tation of the successes and failures of the Peck machine.
S. T. Hauser received copies of Manager Aldridge's lengthy letter
to the United Smelting and Refining Company executive board.

Since the

36. Letter, W. H. Aldridge to Barton Sewell, February 9, 1897, HP,
Box 32, folder 33.
37. Ibid. See also W. H. Aldridge to Barton Sewell, February 19,
1897, HP, Box 25, folder 39.
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company's support of the Missouri River dam was tied intricately to the
new Peck mill at East Helena, Hauser feared that skepticism of one ven38
ture would hurt the other.
In a detailed letter to Director Abram
Hewitt, Hauser restated to the Board his faith in the benefit of using
the Peck machine to work the Rimini ores.

He claimed that he had re

ceived a further endorsement from the Peck investors in Chicago as to
the reliability of this device.

Hauser also explained that the Peck-

Montana Company stood to make no direct monetary return from the rework
ing of the Rimini tailings, but expected to profit from the royalties
it would receive on each ton of ore that was concentrated.

Hauser re

minded Hewitt that it had been the United Company that had urged the
construction of a new complex that would utilize more of the power pro
duced by the Helena Water and Electric Power Company generating plant.
Hauser now claimed that he had been leery of it all the time.
less, the Helenan repeated his assertion that

Neverthe

. . we have made tests

of the Rimini ore; that I have these reports with me, and that I can
duplicate them indefinitely; . . . and that we can work them successfully
39
as proposed."
38. In 1896, Hauser expressed his concern to W. J. Chalmers that
the electrical plant at Corbin not be delaved. The reason for this concern was
that Hauser wanted to demonstrate the benefits of using electricity on
the Peck machine. He hoped that this effort would support his enter
prises on the Missouri River. Letter, S. T. Hauser to W. J. Chalmers,
August 5, 1896, HP Letterpress Books, Box 36, Dec. 13, 1898-Jan. 20,
1901.
39. Hauser's activities during 1896 indicate that he was equally
enthusiastic about the Peck plant at East Helena. Letter, S. T. Hauser
to Abram Hewitt, April 11, 1897, HP, Box 32, folder 34.
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Abram Hewitt, W. S. Gurnee and other executives of the United
Smelting and Refining Company may have been suspect of the Peck machine,
especially when the Corbin plant had to close temporarily in April,
1897.

Nonetheless, the United Company had a tremendous investment in

the Missouri River power development; it was unlikely that the firm
would abandon S. T. Hauser even if the Peck-Montana Company proved to
be a failure.

In July, 1897, Hauser reported to 0. R. Allen, manager

of the Helena and Livingston Smelter and Reduction Company plant at
Corbin, that the United Company had voted unanimously to complete the
40
dam and to fund the Peck concentrator in East Helena.
Construction began on the Peck plant in November, 1897.

Ten months

later, it was complete and awaiting the extension of a power line from
Canyon Ferry.

The twenty-nine foot high timber crib dam at Canyon

Ferry was scheduled for completion before the Peck concentrator.

High

water in the late spring of 1898 caused some minor damage to the struc
ture, however, and the dam's engineer, N. L. Cooper, could not finish
it until October, 1898.^
Completion of the Canyon Ferry Dam on the Missouri River and the
Peck-Montana Company plant at East Helena temporarily satisfied S. T.
Hauser.

He remarked that:

40. Letter, S. T. Hauser to 0. R. Allen, July 16, 1897, HP,
Box 32, folder 34.
41. Letters, S. T. Hauser to A. J. Davis, March 26, 1898, HP
Letterpress Books, HP, Box 36, Dec. 13, 1898-Jan. 20, 1901; S. T. Hauser
to W. J. Chalmers, Sept. 26, 1898, HP Letterpress Books, Box 36, Dec. 13,
1898-Jan. 20, 1901; W. A. Clark to S. T. Hauser, June 25, 1898, HP,
Box 25, folder 38; S. T. Hauser to W. A. Clark, June 24, 1898, HP Letter
press Books, Box 36, Dec. 13, 1898-Jan. 20, 1901.
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I can only add that it verifies what I so long
contended, that by working large quantities the
Peck machine can and will make good interest on
large capital, provided they can have cheat)
power, which I have succeeded in securing.^
Two years later, a reporter for a national engineering and mining jour
nal commented that credit was certainly due Hauser for maintaining his
43
faith in the Peck concentrator despite repeated, costly failures.
Hauser's momentary triumph did not allay the criticism of numerous
skeptics.

Writing to Northern Pacific Railway Company President C. S.

Mellen in 1899, Hauser tried to dismiss rumors of the machine's failures
that had come to Mellen via "some of your subordinates who were pre44
judiced or misinformed."
Hauser stated that the concentrator had
successfully worked more than 70,000 tons of ore that could not have
been smelted otherwise.

He added that the Peck machine had just begun

to work the Rimini ore and that this would prove an even greater profit.
Striking for the economic heart of Mellen, Hauser claimed that the Peck
mill provided twenty-five percent of the ores smelted at the United
plant and that this supply undoubtedly raised the freight revenue of
the railway company.

Hauser optimistically predicted that "there is

42. Letter, S. T. Hauser to Thomas A. Banning, November 20, 1898,
HP Letterpress Books, Box 36, Dec. 13, 1898-Jan. 20, 1901.
43. The Engineering and Mining Journal, March 31, 1900, p. 375.
Other Montana mining magazines praised the important events at East
Helena. For example, see Western Mining World, January 2, 1897, Vol. 6,
No. 120, p. 17, and January 16, 1897, Vol. 6, No. 122, p. 51. See
also John Herron, "Address Before the Montana Society of Civil Engineers,"
Association of Engineering Societies, March, 1897, Vol. 18, No. 3,
p. 146.
44. Letter, S. T. Hauser to C. S. Mellen, December 2, 1899, HP,
Box 33, folder 2.
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every reasonable probability that we will have to double or treble the
plant to be able to handle the ore that will be mined in this vicinity."

45

By 1898, S. T. Hauser had attained his goal of constructing the
Peck concentrator in East Helena and the first hydroelectric facility
on the Missouri River at Canyon Ferry.

He also had successfully linked

the United Smelting and Refining Company's economic interest to the new
application of electric power.

Soon after these facilities were operat

ing (1900), the United Company reorganized into the American Smelting
and Refining Company, and S. T. Hauser ended his active interest in the
former business.

At the same time, he encountered difficulties in se

curing enough profit to keep the Peck concentrator open, and turned his
attention from that operation and devoted himself fully to promoting
the electric power industry.
In October, 1900, Hauser reorganized the Helena Water and Electric
Power Company and formed the Missouri River Power Company.

While the

American Smelting and Refining Company, as successor to the United
Company, retained a financial interest in the Missouri River Power
Company, it was Hauser's old Helena Livingston Smelting and Reduction
Company that controlled the largest block of the new power company's
stock.

Consequently, Samuel Hauser became president of the Missouri

River Power Company, appointing M. H. Gerry as his chief engineer and
general manager.^® As the head of the new enterprise, Hauser emphasized
45.

Ibid.

46. Letters, S. T. Hauser to T. A. Marlow, March 15, 1901, and
S. T. Hauser to W. A. Clark, October 26, 1901, HP, Box 33, folder 2.
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his commitment to expanding electric service by negotiating with the
Northern Pacific Railway Company for a transmission line right-of-way to ,
the mining center of Butte.
~

line in 1901.
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He completed the 66,000 volt transmission

During the same period, Hauser projected an expansion

of Canyon Ferry Dam.
The Missouri River Power Company's objective in this expansion was
to supply electric power to the rapidly developing mining industry in
the Butte/Anaconda area.

One independent report to a New York banking

institution that had financial interest in Hauser's economic affairs
commented on the marketing goals of the Missouri River Company.
The business of the Missouri River Power Company
is to generate and sell electric power in large
units only. The Company does not have to seek a
market. It accepts only business of the kind it
prefers. For example, while the Butte Railway
& Electric Light Co. has been writing to ask for
power, the Missouri River Power Company, having
the opportunity of contracting with a score of
companies that use power, wisely reserves its
contracts for those customers that use the cur
rent most uniformly, such as the smelters and
the mines that use current for their blowers or
air condensers and their pumps. 48
This investigator added that the Missouri River Power Company's future
was impressive and that previously published reports on its prospects
47. Letters, S. T. Hauser to J. N. Hannaford, May 21, 1900, HP,
Box 33, folder 2; S. T. Hauser to Henry Blakely, October 30, 1900, HP
Letterpress Books, HP, Box 36, Dec. 13, 1898-Jan. 20, 1901; Hauser also
planned to expand facilities at the Canyon Ferry power plant. Letter,
M. H. Gerry to S. T. Hauser, July 27, 1901, HP, Box 27, folder 7. See
also Max Hebgen, "Hydroelectric Development in Montana," p. 793.
48. Letter, Rufus Waples to J. W. Seligman and Co., April 10, 1901,
HP, Box 27, folder 14.

were "unusually conservative."
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Samuel Hauser's foresight and ambition had driven him, in less than
five years, to the leadership of an industry with enormous economic
potential.

He had rebounded from financial ruin and had made plans to

expand his electrical interests throughout central Montana.
A number of out-of-state investors assisted S. T. Hauser in pro
motion of his water power properties.

Barton Sewell, general manager

of the United Smelting and Refining Company, had been associated with
Hauser and the Helena and Livingston Company's mining properties for
many years.

In February, 1896, when Hauser itfas searching for financial

support for his dam, Sewell wrote the ex-Governor offering to "do every50
thing I can in reference to the proposed water power."
Henry Villard,
at that time president of the Northern Pacific Railway Company, joined
Sewell in sponsoring the project by loaning Samuel Hauser $25,000 with
which to purchase stock in the Helena Water and Electric Power Company.
Leading all interests in encouraging Hauser was the firm of Albert 0.
Seligman, former Montana mine promoter and territorial legislator.
Seligman's New York City banking house had considerable interest in the
Helena and Livingston Smelting and Reduction Company.

Since this company

owned the largest share of stock in the water power company, Seligman had
49.

Ibid.

50. Letter, Barton Sewell to S. T. Hauser, February 17/ 1896,
HP, Box 25, folder 7.
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an understandable concern for the progress of the dam project.

51

Montanans also backed S. T. Hauser in the new power enterprises.
Anton M. Holter was an old supporter of Hauser who had joined the exGovernor in various investment schemes.

Holter was part owner in the

Helena Electric Railway Company and had a keen interest in the applica
tion of electricity to commercial businesses.

Anton Holter was one of

the earliest investors in Hauser's Missouri River Power Company and con
tinued his interest in that firm through the first decade of the twen52
tieth century.
Samuel Hauser's most important ally in the power project, and one
that he spent a good deal of time courting, was William A. Clark.

The

Clark/Hauser relationship began during Montana's early territorial days.
Both men had come to the region during the 1860s and had turned from
speculative mining ventures in Bannack to more assured commercial en
deavors.

Clark and Hauser joined each other briefly in a banking firm

in Deer Lodge in 1872.

Clark, however, abandoned the cause of national

banking when he became interested in mining properties in Butte and
opened a private bank in that community in 1878.

Politically, Hauser

51. Letter, S. T. Hauser to H. Villard, May 2, 1896, HP, Box 32,
folder 33. Hauser wrote repeatedly to Henry Seligman in New York
advising him on the progress of the project.
52. Anton Holter had been chiefly responsible for developing the
silver mines at Elkhorn, Montana. He also sold mining machinery at his
hardware store in Helena. Holter owned 15,000 shares of the Missouri
River Power Company. See Letter, S. T. Hauser to Charles Clark,
August 29, 1900, HP Letterpress Books, Box 36, Dec. 13, 1898-Jan. 20,
1901; and Michael Maione and Richard Roeder» Montana: A History of Two
Centuries (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1976), p. 144.
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and Clark were strong Democrats whd spent time and money promoting the
town of Helenr during the capital fight of 1894.

During William A.

Clark's unsuccessful attempt to retain his ill-gotten United States
Senate seat in 1899, S. T. Hauser journeyed to Washington, D.C. to
testify in defense of his friend.®"*
Hauser secured W. A. Clark's support in the dam-building enterprise
in two ways.

The transmission of power from Canyon Ferry Dam required

a considerable amount of copper wire* and Hauser went to one of Clark's
Butte copper companies to purchase the necessary material.

His interest

peaked, Clark contributed $50,000 to the formation of the Helena Water
and Electric Power Company.

When Hauser proposed expanding his power

facilities to serve the Butte/Anaconda market, he again turned to then
Senator William Clark for additional copper wire.

Hauser also facili

tated the flow of Clark's money into the power company's coffers by
negotiating favorable contracts for the delivery of electricity to the
senator's mines and smelter in Butte.

In 1900, Hauser concluded an

agreement with Clark to furnish power to the Butte Reduction Works, the
54
Butte Electric Railway, and the Original, Stewart, and Colusa mines.
53. Michael Leeson, History of Montana (Chicago, 1886), pp. 13261327; C. B. Glasscock, The War of the Copper Kings: Builders of Butte
and Wolves of Wall Street (New York: Grosset and Dun!ap, 1935), p. 190;
Hakola, "Samuel T. Hauser," p. 105.
54. Letters: S. T. Hauser to W. A. Clark, June 24, 1898, HP Letter
press Books, Box 36, Dec. 13, 1898-Jan. 20, 1901; W. A. Clark to S. T.
Hauser, June 25, 1898, HP, Box 25, folder 38; S. T. Hauser to Harvey
Barbour, March 10, 1898, HP, Box 32, folder 33; "Agreement," August 4,
1900, HP, Box 63, folder 4; S. T. Hauser to H. H. Rogers, August 31,
1901, HP Letterpress Books, Box 36, Dec. 13, 1898-Jan. 20, 1901; S. T.
Hauser to Charles W. Clark, August 29, 1900, Letterpress Books, Box 36,
Dec. 13, 1898-Jan. 20, 1901.
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Missouri River Power Company President Hauser continued to press
W. A. Clark for financial support during the years immediately following
1900.

Unfortunately, Clark's election to the United States Senate in

1901 and his subsequent settlement of difficulties with the Amalgamated
55
Copper Company directed his attention elsewhere.
In the senator's
absences, Hauser's general manager, M. H. Gerry, had to negotiate with
Clark's agent, A. H. Wethey.
Gerry and Wethey did not agree on the suitability of hydroelectric
power for mine equipment.

Wethey advised Clark that the senator could

not rely on water power produced electricity, since there would be a
power deficiency at times of low water.

Gerry retorted that Clark's

plants were receiving power from a small hydroelectric facility on the
Big Hole River on a day-to-day basis without a seeming concern for
whether or not the service would be interrupted.

Neither Gerry nor

Hauser saw any reason why Clark and Wethey could not patronize the
Missouri River Power Company.

Clark responded to the Missouri River men

that his contract with the Big Hole firm (the first Montana Power Company)
ran for a number of months.

When that obligation ended, he would give

preference to the Missouri River Power Company.

Clark added that, "It

would be well for Mr. Gerry to get a little better acquainted with the
56
facts in the case before criticizing Mr. Wethey."
55. A seeming ally of F. Augustus Heinze and opponent of the copper
trust during the state elections of 1900, Clark broke with the Butte
renegade soon after the election tally. After his election to the U.S.
Senate, Clark spent less and less time in Montana.
56. Letter, W. A. Clark to S. T. Hauser, March 26, 1902, HP, Box 27,
folder 26. See also Letters, W. A. Clark to S. T. Hauser, April 15, 1902,
July 13, 1902, July 15, 1902, HP, Box 27, folder 26.
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Despite these minor personality and business conflicts, Hauser and
Clark remained on the best of terms.

W. A. Clark's financial interest

in the Missouri River Power Company, and subsequent Hauser-operated
power companies, remained substantial.

While Clark represented Montana

in the United States Senate (1901-1907), Hauser frequently requested
his friend to intercede on the company's behalf with the Department of
the Interior.®^
Samuel Hauser required the encouragement and the financial support
of his various associates to promote his electric generating companies.
Without their money and the exercise of their respective influences,
he would not have been able to proceed with either the construction and
enlargement of Canyon Ferry Dam or the extension of a high voltage trans
mission line to Butte.

By demonstrating a continued faith in the strength

of the state's economy, Hauser welded his and other capitalists' percep
tions of the possibilities of electric generation into an effective power
enterprise.
Hauser understood that that strength depended upon the continued
economic growth of Montana's mining industry.

In addition to the support

of his numerous associates, the Helena power promoter needed to capture
the interest and financial backing of the state's newest mining conglom
erate, the Amalgamated Copper Company.
57. Letters, S. T. Hauser to C. S. Mellen, September 25, 1901, HP,
Box 33, folder 4; S. T. Hauser to Charles W. Clark, August 20, 1900,
HP Letterpress Books, Box 36, Dec. 13, 1898-Jan. 20, 1901; W. A. Clark
to S. T. Hauser, March 22, 1906, HP, Box 28, folder 3; W. A. Clark to
Hauser, February 9, 1906, HP, Box 28, folder 33.
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Amalgamated*s Montana roots were in the first efforts of Marcus
Daly to develop copper mines in the territory.

Daly's initial forays

into the Butte mining center in the 1870s convinced him that the future
of that area was in copper, not silver.

He convinced fellow investors

George Hearst, James Ben Ali Haggin, and Lloyd Tevis of the accuracy of
these findings and, with their help, formed the Anaconda Copper Mining
Company in the early 1880s.

The Anaconda Company's copper reduction

works and giant Washoe Smelter, constructed in 1884 at Anaconda, Montana,
symbolized the primacy of the company in the nation's copper mining
industry.
Marcus Daly and his investors from California were not the only
persons who were interested in the^copperlodes of Butte.

Boston capi

talists, having reaped large profits from the Michigan copper mining
regions, turned their collective attentions to the mineral areas of
58
Montana in the 1890s.
Henry H. Rogers, Thomas Lawson and other offi
cials of one of the nation's largest corporations, the Standard Oil
Company, also cast a speculative eye towards the Butte/Anaconda area.
Rogers, who may have become interested in copper from his associa
tions with Back Bay mining tycoons, began negotiating with Marcus Daly
59
for the Anaconda properties in 1898.
According to contemporary ac
counts, Rogers was a kind and engaging fellow to both his friends and
58. The Butte and Boston Consolidated Mining Company and the
Boston and Montana Mining Company are the best examples of investment in
Montana by Boston capitalists. Maione and Roeder, Montana, pp. 157-58.
59.

Glasscock, War of the Copper Kings, pp. 205-06.
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to those he sought to influence.

But he was also one of the nation's

leading businessmen and had succeeded John 0. Rockefeller to the presi
dency of Standard Oil because of an ability to squeeze the last ounce
of profit from a dollar's investment.^
Rogers and Standard Oil Company concluded their negotiations with
Daly, Haggin, and Tevis in 1899.

The Amalgamated Copper Company was

formed soon after the sale to act as a holding company for the Anaconda
properties.

Marcus Daly was the copper trust's first president and, on

his death in 1900, Henry Rogers rose to the Amalgamated's presidency.
At that point, Rogers was engaged in his famous copper war with F.
Augustus Heinze.

His immediate objective was to wrest control of the

Butte mines from the flamboyant Heinze and in so doing to consolidate
all copper production in Montana under the leadership of Amalgamated.
S. T. Hauser considered the Amalgamated Copper Company to be one
of the largest potential customers for electricity in the state.

The

copper trust, having purchased fifteen percent of the Missouri River
Power Company in 1900, also was a likely source of capital for the Butte
transmission line and the enlargement of Canyon Ferry Dam.
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Hauser

pursued both goals in his 1901 campaign to enlist the support of Henry
H. Rogers and his copper company.
Hauser initially directed his efforts towards securing the necessary
funds from Rogers to complete the transmission line and dam project.
60.

Ibid., pp. 202-03.

61. Letter, S. T. Hauser to William SealIon, March 2, 1901, HP,
Box 33, folder 4.

He
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argued that raising the height of Canyon Ferry would increase the
Missouri River Power Company's power transmission from 3,000 h.p. to
9,000 h.p.

Claiming support in these estimates from Amalgamated and

American Smelting and Refining Company engineers, Hauser explained that
these men were contemplating electrifying their companies' plants.
H. H. Rogers, acting upon the strength of these reports and the value of
Amalgamated's interest in the Missouri River company, agreed to loan
CO

Hauser $75,000 to complete the power company's expansion.
Rogers' support of the two projects was critical to Hauser's ability
to continue construction in 1901.

The Helena power promoter failed,

however, to convince H. H. Rogers to commit himself immediately to
Hauser's other proposal—construction of a second Missouri River dam.
Hauser planned to erect his second dam eighteen miles below the
Canyon Ferry plant.

Early in March, 1901, he attempted to interest

Rogers and Amalgamated in the project.
top official

In a letter to Amalgamated's

in Butte, William SealIon, Hauser proposed contructing

the new facility if the copper company would take additional power and
would double its investment in the Missouri River Power Company.

Seal Ion

was leery of the Missouri River's ability to furnish enough water for
two hydroelectric facilities so close together and he recommended to
Rogers that he withhold approval of any agreement until an independent
investigation of the project could be made.

An investigation of the

Canyon Ferry plant and the new dam site., conducted during the spring of
62. Letter, S. T. Hauser to H. H. Rogers, March 21, 1905, HP,
Box 33, folder 8. Also see letter, S.T. Hauser, February 4, 1901, HP,
Box 33, folder 4.
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1901, confirmed Scallon's suspicions.

Consequently, Rogers informed

Hauser that the necessary funds for construction of the new power plant
would have to await proof of the Missouri River eompany's ability to
CO
transmit constant power from its present facility.
Despite this rebuff, S. T. Hauser continued his efforts to commit
Rogers and Amalgamated to the new dam project.

Hauser argued that hydro

electric power was decidedly more economical to the mining company than
steam power, the former costing only $88 to $90 per horsepower per annum
and the latter $150.

Countering the argument that making the necessary

equipment conversion to electricity would be overly expensive, Hauser
explained that, " . . . you will also find that we can furnish you the
power at a rate that will save you, each and every year, the entire cost
64
of installing the power and making the change."
Taking up the elec
trical cudgel, General Manager M. H. Gerry informed Hauser that one min
ing engineer at the Amalgamated Company wanted electricity instead of
65
steam power in order to reduce the temperatures in mine shafts.
63. Letters, S. T. Hauser to Board of Directors, H. & L. S. & R.
Co., July 12, 1901, HP Letterpress Books, Box 36, Dec. 13, 1898-Jan. 20,
1901; S. T. Hauser to Clark, Dodge and Co., April 16, 1901, HP, Box 33,
folder 4; S. T. Hauser to Barton Sewell, July 24, 1901, HP Letterpress
Books, Box 36, Dec. 13, 1898-Jan. 20, 1901; S. T. Hauser to Barton
Sewell, July 19, 1901, HP Letterpress Books, Box 36, Dec. 13, 1898Jan. 20, 1901; S. T. Hauser to William Scallon, March 2, 1901, HP,
Box 33, folder 4.
64. Letter, S. T. Hauser to B. B. Thayer, May 10, 1904, HP, Box 33,
folder 7. See also S. T. Hauser to H. H. Rogers, June 24, 1903, HP,
Box 33, folder 6.
65. Letter, M. H. Gerry to S. T. Hauser, February 27, 1905, HP,
Box 28, folder 4.
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Gerry discovered one reason for the Amalgamated Company's reluctance
to jump wholeheartedly into Hauser's venture, when he suggested that the
copper trust's ownership of coal mines prevented the company from con
verting immediately to hydroelectricity.

He warned Hauser that Amalga

mated would eventually realize the savings in electricity, but that their
commitment to coal properties would delay their decision to convert.
In view of these conditions the maintaining of
certain coal properties on a narrow margin of
profit will not ultimately prevent the applica
tion of electricity power, but it may, of course,
tend to delay it. and that is what confronts us
at the present."®
S. T. Hauser's sale of Helena and Livingston Smelting and Reduction
Company stock to H. H. Rogers in 1903 partially contributed to AmalgamatedlsjrefusaT to back fully the electrical ventures.

That sale in

cluded an interest in coal properties from which the copper company in
tended to supply its smelters.

When the coal from these properties

proved less desirable than expected, Amalgamated officials decided in
1905 to liquidate the coal company for what was owed the copper firm in
undelivered fuel.
decision.

Hauser, ironically, was caught in the middle of this

On the one hand, the failure to provide adequate coking coal

underscored his claims of the value of electricity; yet, Amalgamated's
change to that power source deflated the value of his coal properties.®^
66.

Ibid.

67. Letter, S. T. Hauser to H. H. Rogers, June 24, 1903, HP, Box
33, folder 6. Hauser wrote to Rogers in November stating that, "You will
probably know of this program in a general way [closing out the coal com
pany] which on its face seems fair, but in fact would not be, and in my
opinion would be unjust to my associates, and ultimately work injury to
your Company." Letter, S. T. Hauser to H. H. Rogers, November 15, 1905,
HP, Box 33, folder 8.
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Samuel Hauser's promotion of competing power sources may have caused
him temporary embarrassment, but his commitment to the construction of
the second Missouri River dam did not wane.

During the winter of 1905,

Hauser developed a plan to finance the plant through a newly-formed com
pany, the Helena Power Transmission Company.

This firm was owned and

controlled by the stockholders of the Missouri River Power Company.
Hauser estimated that the Helena Power Transmission Company could finance
the new dam for approximately $700,000,

Extension of a transmission line

from the Missouri River company's Butte substation to Amalgamated's new
Washoe Works at Anaconda would require an additional $100,000.

Hauser

proposed to H. H. Rogers and to Amalgamated that they provide the financ
ing for this construction program and in return, the copper company would
receive a contract for electric power that was substantially lower than
the price it paid for steam power.

Rogers would benefit doubly through

his interest in the Helena and Livingston Company which still owned
forty percent of the Missouri River Power Company.

68

By 1905, H. H. Rogers and other Amalgamated officials were convinced
that the application of electricity to the Butte and Anaconda plants was
both feasible and profitable.

Dispelling their cautious behavior of four

years previous, they eagerly agreed to finance Hauser's companies.

In

May, 1905, Rogers concluded an agreement with Hauser for a personal loan
of $750,000.

Hauser raised the ante a few days later, and Rogers amended

the agreement to provide an additional $150,000.

This increased funding

68. Letters, S: T. Hauser to H. H. Rogers, March 21, 1905, and
March 27, 1905, HP, Box 33/ folder 8.
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allowed the Helena Power Transmission Company to construct a coal-fired,
69
steam-powered auxiliary plant in Butte.
Agents of Amalgamated evidenced an equally tough bargaining stance
when they exacted a power contract from M. H. Gerry, reducing the annual
charge from $50 to $40 per horsepower.

In addition, the new contract

had a provision holding the power company libel for non-performance.

It

was this clause in the contract that would cause S. T. Hauser difficul
ties three years later.^
During the spring and early summer of 1905, S. T. Hauser and M. H.
Gerry exchanged correspondence concerning the selection of a site for
the new dam.

The original location required construction of a forty-one

foot high dam with a capacity to generate 8,000 horsepower.

Gerry con

vinced Hauser that this amount of electricity was not sufficient to meet
the increased requests for power.

With 17,000 horsepower contracted for

sale in July, 1905, Gerry reasoned that the electrical production of the
old dam (Canyon Ferry), the new dam(Hauser), and double the size of the
steam plant in Butte would be necessary to meet the demand.^

The gen

eral manager proposed a new site for the second dam that was four miles
69. Letters, M. H. Gerry to S. T. Hauser, April 21, 1905, and S. T.
Hauser to H. H. Rogers, May 17, 1905, HP, Box 33, folder 8; H. H. Rogers
to S. T. Hauser, May 24, 1905, HP, Box 28, folder 7; "Agreement Between
H. H. Rogers and S. T. Hauser," May 12, 1905, HP, Box 63, folder 5.
70. M. H. Gerry admitted to Hauser that, "I would have preferred
leaving out this clause, but it is really of very little moment."
Letter, M. H. Gerry to S. T. Hauser, May 3, 1905, HP, Box 28, folder 24.
71. "Extract From Letter to Hon. W. A. Clark," April 10, 1905,
HP, Box 33, folder 8, and Letter, M. H. Gerry to S. T. Hauser, May 27,
1905, HP, Box 28, folder 24.
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downstream from the original location.

Hauser accepted this recommenda

tion and, by October, 1905, had received authorization from the Secretary
72
of War to construct Hauser Dam.
The power company president reported to H. H. Rogers in late
October, 1905, that the Helena Power Transmission Company's sixty-five
foot high dam would have a generating capacity of 18,000 horsepower.
Completion of the new plant, and the increased power available from
Canyon Ferry, and the steam-powered auxiliary plant at Butte, would.
give the power companies a total supply of 24,000 intermittent and con^tant horsepower.

Hauser explained to Rogers that the second dam would

be constructed of concrete and steel as opposed to the previous timber
and crib dam.

The larger size of the new dam and plant, its steel con

struction, and the increased cost of the new site had driven the cost of
the facility from $800,000 to nearly $1,000,000.

Gerry admitted to

Hauser that the cost of a steel dam increased the price by $30,000, but
he claimed that it would " . . . have nearly twice the factor of safety,
73
and can be completed within at least four months less time."
The time
consideration was of particular importance to a financially strapped
Samuel Hauser.
Hauser Dam required little more than one year to construct.
operational by January, 1907.

It was

Hauser wrote to W. A. Clark explaining

72. "Authorization," October 29, 1905, FPC, Box 9, folder 14.
Letter, S. T. Hauser to Board of Directors, July 10, 1905» HP, Box 33,
folder 8.
73. Letter, M. H. Gerry to S. T. Hauser, October 9, 1905, HP,
Box 28, folder 21.
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that there had been a six-month delay in completing the plant, but that
he believed that it was " . . . beyond question [that] we have the most
durable and substantial dam in the entire country (rock, steel, and
cement)." 7 ^
S. T. Hauser did not plan to end his hydroelectric expansion with
completion of his second

dam.

While that facility was under construc

tion during the spring of 1906, the power promoter advocated formation
of yet another electric generating firm.

This new company, entitled

the United Missouri River Power Company, was incorporated under the laws
of the state of New Jersey in the spring of 1906.

Hauser explained to

W. A. Clark that this new company was " . . . the virtual consolidation
of the two companies." 7 ®

Hauser and his associates, through the Helena

and Livingston Smelting and Reduction Company, retained the largest
block of stock in the new business; H. H. Rogers and William A. Clark
were the second and third largest shareholders of the United company. 7 ®
Hauser's foremost reason for urging creation of the United Missouri
River Power Company was to increase the capital stock of the two old
firms and to supply himself with enough cash to repay outstanding debts.
As he explained to his wife, Ellen, in March, 1906, ". . . at last I can
say, we can, within six months, pay our debts—and have three or four
74. Letter, S. T. Hauser to W. A. Clark, November 5, 1906, HP,
Box 33, folder 9.
75. Letter, S. T. Hauser to W. A. Clark, March 21, 1906, HP,
Box 33, folder 9.
76. Letter, S. T. Hauser to W. A. Clark, March 9, 1908, HP,
Box 33, folder 11.
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hundred thousand left for our children."

Ellen Hauser died that same

year without realizing benefits from her husband's expectations.^
In addition to the desire to liquidate his indebtedness, S. T.
Hauser had other motives in forming the United company.

In a letter to

old friend Henry Seligman, the entrepreneur revealed his design.
If, under the proposed plan, we can or could
materially increase our bond issue, and use
the bonds, or the proceeds thereof, in adding
to the two present plants or construct a third
dam-or plant, if you please, it would weigF
greatly in deciding and enabling me to bring
about the proposed merger.
Hauser controlled what he believed was the last suitable site for a dam
on the Missouri River between Three Forks and Great Falls.

He believed

that construction of a dam at the new location would place him in a
position to control any attempt to consolidate power facilities on the
river.

With this inducement, he turned once again to Henry H. Rogers

for support.
In 1906, Rogers and the Amalgamated Company had completed their
intimidation of the Montana legislature and were preparing to issue the
coup de grace to their pernicious enemy, F. Augustus Heinze.

Heinze's

sale of his United Copper Company to the copper trust in 1906 capped the
Amalgamated Copper Company's drive to consolidate the copper mining
77. "Extracts from Letters S. T. Hauser to Ellen F. Hauser,"
January 23, 1906 to March 20, 1906, HP, Box 33, folder 9. See also
S. T. Hauser to Board of Directors, Helena Power Transmission Company,
July 6, 1906, HP, Box 33, folder 9.
78. Letter, S. T. Hauser to Henry Seligman, August 6, 1906, HP,
Box 33, folder 9.
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industry in Montana.

With this accomplished, H. H. Rogers and other

Amalgamated officials turned their attention to expanding mining facili
ties i n Butte* Anaconda and Great Fal1s.
Hauser immediately offered to supply Rogers with the additional
power that his plants required, anticipating that the copper tycoon's
investments in all three power companies would compel him to support an
expansion of the firms' facilities.

Confiding to Henry Seligman in the

late summer of 1906, Hauser wrote that he was " . . . dealing with one
of the ablest men in this or any Country [RogersJ, [butJ . . . as you
know, so far, I have presented no proposition that he did not accept,
79
without scarcely any changes."
Hauser's plan to refinance the old companies by organizing the
United Missouri River Power Company was successful.

It did not, how

ever, allow him to proceed with location of the third dam.

Passage of

the General Dam Act in April, 1906 (34 Stat. 11) may have forced Hauser
to form yet another company that would be free to solicit a construction
permit without the encumbrance of two earlier permits.

In 1906, he or

ganized the Capital City Improvement Company and received federal ap80
proval to construct a new hydroelectric plant on the Missouri River.
During the next five years, Hauser and his associates proceeded with plans
79. Ibid. See also Letter, S. T. Hauser to H. H. Rogers,
February 17, 1906, HP, Box 33, folder 9.
80. "Investigation to Determine Whether Hydroelectric Developments
Should Be Licensed by the Federal Power Commission," IT-5840, U. S.
Federal Power Commission Reports, Vol. 8 (1948), p. 183. The United
Missouri River Power Company and the Capital City Improvement Company
maintained their respective identities until 1910. The distinction be
tween the two companies was a matter of legal convenience. Most
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to erect what eventually became Holter Dam.

[See Appendix "A" for a

diagram of Montana electric power companies.]
S. T. Hauser was 73 years old in 1906.

In thirteen years, he had

overcome financial ruin and had organized four power companies.

His

accomplishments included the enlistment of many of Montana's wealthiest
residents and the backing of one of the nation's largest mining corpora
tions and richest capitalists.

This aging pioneer had financed construc

tion of the state's two largest hydroelectric plants and the longest
single transmission line.
More important than all of these successes was Hauser's proof of
the applicability of electricity to industrial usage.

By 1906, he had

demonstrated clearly that electricity, generated from a single waterpowered plant, could be transmitted to that state's rapidly expanding
industrial centers.

This one accomplishment did more to promote elec

trical development in Montana than did any previous endeavor.
On April 14, 1908, W. A. Clark received a note from Hauser stating
that the Secretary of War had approved plans for the third dam on the
Missouri River.

In response, Clark characterized Hauser's successes by

writing that " . . . everything was lovely, and I shall take for grartted
81
that 'the goose hangs high'."
Hauser's triumph was evident and
Clark's comment ironic.

At four p.m. on April 14, 1908, the Helena

supporters and competitors of Hauser referred to his power firm as the
United Missouri River Company. In January, 1910, Hauser and his associ
ates hoped to raise additional capital for the third dam by merging the
two firms and reissuing bonds.
81. Letter, W. A. Clark to S. T. Hauser, April 14, 1908, HP,
Box 29, folder 18.
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Power Transmission Company's Hauser Dam collapsed in a spring flood.
That event triggered the decline of Hauser's hydroelectric empire and
his eventual loss of the United Missouri River Power Company.

CHAPTER III

HAUSER'S OPPOSITION AND THE FAILURE OF THE SECOND DAM
/

The months of January and February, 1908, were warmer than normal
across much of Montana.

The mean temperature for most of the state in

January was between 25 and 35 degrees, cooling only a bit to the midtwenties in February.

The maximum temperature during January reached

as high as 50 degrees in most areas of Montana.

Precipitation during

the first two months of the new year also was slightly abnormal, with
the greatest deficiency showing in the mountain snowpackJ

Balmy

weather in the northwest contributed to a feeling of optimism for an
early spring and a return to out-of-doors activities.
While the weather was temperate during mid-winter, 1908, its
promise of a mild and short spring was deceptive.

March proved to be

windy, with excessive precipitation reported in many localities.

April

and the first weeks of May showed signs of a return to spring conditions,
but, in late May and early June, more than twice the average rain and
2
snow fell in the western portions of Montana.
Heavy rainfall and the
late appearance of a heavy snowpack in the western mountains caused
1. U.S. Weather Bureau, Climatoloqical Data—Montana Section,
Vols. 8-11 (Washington, 1905-1908), p. 99.
2.

Ibid., pp. 99-100.
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rivers to rise to recordheights.

The result was some of the most seri

ous and dramatic floods in Montana's climatological history.
The high spring "run-off" of 1908 challenged the stability of many
small dams on rivers and creeks throughout Montana.
Eagle

The dam at Black

Falls faced the possibility of eminent destruction on June 5, as

more than 6.5 feet of water poured over the top of the flashboards for
3
twenty-four hours.
One facility that was not threatened by the record
rise of early June, 1908, was Hauser Dam.

The dam, reportedly "one of

the finest structures of this kind in the world," had succumbed to one
of the first spring freshets on April 14, 1908.

Seepage of water through

the base of the dam, at the juncture of the steel plates and the bedrock,
undermined the structure and forced its collapse.

Hauser Dam required

more than a year's labor to construct and demanded less than ten minutes
to wash away.^
Collapse of the dam caused a wall of water to be sent rushing down
the channel of the Missouri River, sweeping five company houses, an
office building and a stable before the flood.

Miraculously, though

the powerhouse was filled with water, none of the more than thirty
workers at the plant was killed.

Damage to the dam and power plant was

of less immediate concern to local residents than was the impending
disaster to the downstream inhabitants of Craig, Cascade and Great Falls.
3. "Floods of 1892 and 1908 Are Recalled by Old Timers," Univer
sity of Montana Library and Archives, Missoula, Montana, Clipping Files,
File: "Floods and Flood Control."
4.

The Helena Independent, April 15, 1908, p. 1.
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Forewarned of the flood by telegraph, occupants of the small river
community of Craig abandoned their homes for higher ground.

In Great

Falls, workmen hurriedly constructed a wing dam in front of the Rainbow
Dam powerhouse and labored through the night of the 14th to protect the
city's low-lying areas.

5

Through quick response and ardent preparation,

the disastrous potential of the flood was not visited upon downstream
Missouri River communties.
Damage to Hauser Dam was substantial.

United Missouri River Power

Company General Manager M. H. Gerry assured local reporters that the
dam would be rebuilt and that, during the interim, power Mould be trans
mitted to Helena, Butte, and Anaconda from the plants at Canyon Ferry
and Butte.

Samuel Hauser, in New York at the time of the flood, re

ceived word of the disaster from manager Gerry.

The ex-governor moved

quickly to reduce alarm by wiring his friend and publisher of the
Helena Independent, John S. M. Neil, that the dam would be repaired and
that work on the third power facility (Holter) would continue.

Neil

responded to Hauser's assurances by praising the power promoter's
optimism.

In an editorial two days after the collapse, Neil wrote that

Hauser's courage made him the " . . . dominant and indomitable spirit of
the biggest, best and most engaging enterprises ever successfully
launched in Montana."®
Hauser's public optimism was not mirrored by a similar private
confidence in the power company's position.

The flood had not only

5.

Ibid., p. 1, and The Story of Montana Power, p. 19.

6.

The Helena Independent, April 16, 1908, p. 4.
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wrecked the dam but had also destroyed the governor's faith in steel
construction.

A concrete structure was planned as a replacement, and

would undoubtedly prove expensive.

There was the additional concern

that during construction revenues would not be available to repay the
debt on the original dam.

Finally, Hauser feared that downstream resi

dents who had been affected by the flood would demand reparations.
While this threat never materialized to any consequence, it worried
Hauser during the months immediately following the dam's collapse. 7
Following the April 14 disaster, Hauser faced his greatest diffi
culties in satisfying contractual obligations to supply power to the
Amalgamated Copper Company plants at Butte and Anaconda.

Although

M, H. Gerry claimed that the Canyon Ferry and Butte facilities could
supply this need, it was obvious to Hauser that there would be a sub
stantial power deficiency.

In 1908, his power companies were not the

only businesses capable of supplying electricity to industry in Butte
and Anaconda.

Two other concerns, one serving Butte under the leader

ship of C. W. Wetmore and the other in Great Falls, headed by John D.
Ryan, had been vying with S. T. Hauser for a share of the electricity
market since 1904.

The disaster of April, 1908, could only encourage

these corporate challengers in their efforts to undermine the former
Montana governor's dominant position.
7. Anton Holter, a director of the company and resident of Helena,
faced the immediate onslaught from these irate Montanans. He repeatedly
wrote Hauser that some form of restitution would have to be provided
them. Letters, A. M. Holter to S. T. Hauser, June 17, 1908, and
July 10, 1908, HP, Box 29, folder 21.
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As noted in an earlier chapter, commercial electricity first came
to Butte in 1883 with the organization of the Brush Electric Light and
Power Company.

Nine years later, the Butte General Electric Company

organized in that community to assume the interests of the Brush Company
and two of its competitors (the Silver Box Electric Light and Power
Company and W. A. Clark's Butte Electric Light and Power Company).

A

subsequent sale and reorganization effort formed the Butte Electric and
Power Company in 1901.

After this date, the New Jersey-incorporated

firm controlled the residential electrical power supply for the communig
ties of Butte and Anaconda.
Creation of the Butte Electric and Power Company was a significant
event for the mining city.

With the establishment of this organization,

the General Electric Company, a corporate giant, dominated residential
power distribution in Butte.

Control was exercised through a director

ship which included C. A. Coffin, president of General Electric, and
C. W. Wetmore, a director of the Electric Bond and Share Company (a
utility holding company).

Of the two men, Wetmore was by far
g
active individual in the Butte Electric and Power Company.

the most

The new Butte Electric Company was predominantly an electricity
distributor.

As such, it held contracts with the city of Butte to supply

power to the community's street lighting and electric railway systems.
8. See Leighton, "The Corporate History of the Montana Power
Company," pp. 7-15, for a fuller detailing of the formation of these
power distribution companies.
9. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Corporations, "Report of the
Commissioner of Corporations on Water-Power Development in the United
States," March 14, 1912, p. 151.
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The company also negotiated easements with the city fathers for pole
lines throughout the town, which were used to carry electricity to city
residents.

The Butte Electric and Power Company first relied on power

generation from a number of steam plants in the Butte area.

After 1901,

the electrical supply was augmented by a hydroelectric facility on the
Big Hole River southwest of Butte.

This water-powered plant on the Big

Hole was owned by the Montana Power Transmission Company which, after
1903, was a subsidiary of the Butte Electric and Power Company.^
C. W. Wetmore's Butte Electric and Power Company served primarily
residential interests in the Butte area at the turn of the century.
Wetmore's successful attempts to acquire hydroelectric facilities to
supplement steam generation plants interested the utility magnate in
expanding both the market for and the supply of electricity in
Montana.^

Electrification of the Amalgamated Copper Company's Butte

and Anaconda mines and smelters at the turn of the century offered
Wetmore an opportunity to enter the industrial market.

To do this,

he necessarily had to compete with the rapidly developing hydroelectric
power complex of S. T. Hauser.
Wetmore's first approach to Hauser's empire was not competition,
but agreement.

Wetmore hoped to interest the Helena promoter in a com

bination of electric facilities which would include the recently
10.
p. 14.

Leighton, "The Corporate History of the Montana Power Company,"

11. The Butte company also received power from the Norris generat
ing facility on the Madison River, operated by the Madison River Power
Company.
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completed Helena Power Transmission Company pole line to Butte (1901).
W. A. Clark reported to Samuel Hauser as early as February, 1903, that
the Butte concern had approached him about a consolidation of electrical
companies.

12

More than a year and a half later, the two Montana inter

ests compiled a list of "suggestions" for combining the interests in
Butte.

The first proposition required the Butte Electric and Power

Company to purchase a third company, the Madison River Power Company,
and then to "consolidate with the Missouri River Company on an equitable
1^
basis."
The second scenario would have allowed the Missouri River
Power Company to join with the Butte Company in joint purchase of the
Madison River properties.

The final suggestion did not constitute a

financial consolidation at all.

Rather, it was a marketing and supply

agreement to allow the Butte Company to purchase businesses in its area
and to garner surplus hydroelectric power from the Missouri River com14
pany's stations near Helena.
None of these suggestions proved immedi
ately satisfactory to the parties involved in the negotiations, although
15
in January, 1905, the idea of consolidation was still being discussed.
A merger of the Hauser and Wetmore power interests was not eminent
in early 1905; yet, both parties realized that some accommodation would
12. Letter, W. A. Clark to S. T. Hauser, February 25, 1903, HP,
Box 27, folder 44.
13. "Suggestions Concerning Combination of Water Power and Elec
tric Companies of Butte, Montana," HP, Box 63, folder 14.
14.

Ibid.

15. See Letter, W. A. Clark to S. T. Hauser, January 11, 1905, HP,
Box 28, folder 19.
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have to be made in order to avoid economically damaging competition.
The situation reached crisis proportions in May, 1905, when both the
Wetmore/Coffin firm and the Hauser companies bid on a contract to supply
power to F. Augustus Heinze's smelter in Butte.

Heinze had previously

been a Hauser customer, and the Helenan saw the Butte Company's bid as
a challenge to the Missouri River Power Company's territory.

Hauser

wired Wetmore, informing him that if the Butte Electric Company pro
ceeded with the Heinze negotiations, he (Hauser) would order his people
to begin looking at Wetmore's customers.

Both parties wanted to avoid

the eminent confrontation and, in mid-May, 1905, concluded an agreement—
to prevent interfering with one another's customers and to "work in
harmony."^
The Hauser-Wetmore agreement to restrain trade in the Butte market
was probably illegal.
than in fact.

No matter; it was observed more in the breach

Neither party really intended to honor the accord.

With

large capital expenditures required for a successful power production
industry, it was understandable that both Wetmore and Hauser had to
secure valuable mining company contracts—mostly in the Butte-Anaconda
area.

F. Augustus Heinze's surrender to Amalgamated in 1906 dictated

that either the two power companies combine or that one eliminate the
other from the marketplace.
C. W. Wetmore revealed his option first in a letter to his Butte
general manager, H. W. Turner, in June, 1906.

Instructing Turner on

16. Letter, S. T. Hauser to Messrs. Thayer and Addicks, May 19,
1905, HP, Box 33, folder 8, and Telegrams, S. T. Hauser to M. H. Gerry,
May 18, 1905, and C. W. Wetmore to H. W. Turner, May 18, 1905, HP,
Box 33, folder 8.
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choosing to electrify an Amalgamated mine or one of an independent com*
pany, Wetmore advised that both were attractive, but:
I am not willing . . . to defer the installation
of the Amalgamated mines in favor of the Lexington
mine, because one main purpose of selecting one of
the Amalgamated mines was to further cement our
relations with Mr. Ryan, which I hope will lead,
within a few months, to a permanent alliance of
great and lasting importance to our interest. 17
The Mr. Ryan of whom Wetmore spoke was John D. Ryan, president of the
Anaconda Copper Mining Company and an investor in hydroelectric proper
ties^ n Great Falls.

Wetmore's stated intention, by 1906, was to com

bine with Ryan and to acquire control of Hauser's Missouri River Power
Company.

18

Born in Michigan, John D. Ryan spent his early adult years learning
the mercantile and sales business in that state.

As a young man in the

1890s, he journeyed west to Denver, Colorado, where he entered the oil
business as a salesman.

A man of considerable business acumen and

ambition, Ryan came to Montana in 1901 and assumed management of the
Marcus Daly Bank and Trust Company.

The young entrepreneur was direct

ing that financial establishment in 1903 when the Daly estate auditor,
19
John Morony, interested him in water power sites in Great Falls.
17. Letter, C. W. Wetmore to H. W. Turner, June 28, 1906, Public
Service Commission Records, RS 107, Public Service Commission (Helena),
Box 37, exhibit 37. (Hereafter cited as PSR.)
18.

Ibid.

19. "Depositions of C. F. Kelley and W. D. Thornton In The Matter
Of The Investigation By The Entitled Commission Of The Montana Power
Company's Reclassification of Electric Plant," PSR, Box 37, pp. 10-13.
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Ryan and Morony maneuvered Marcus Daly's widow into advancing
» capital to purchase the deteriorating facilities of the Boston Electric
Company and the Great Falls Electric and Power Company.

These companies

purchased water power from the Great Falls Water Power and Townsite
Company and generated electricity to the city of Great Falls.

Soon after

his purchase of the Boston Electric Company, Ryan was elected to the
firm's presidency and, two years later in 1906, he incorporated this
business and the recently^-purchased Great Falls Street Railway Company
20
into the Great Falls Electric Properties.
By 1906, John D. 1*yan was one of the most prominent Industrialists
in Montana.

He not only controlled the consolidated electric facilities

in Great Falls, but held the joint post of managing director for Amal
gamated Copper Company, and president of Anaconda Copper Mining Company.
The latter positions tied Ryan to the Standard Oil Trust of Henry Rogers
and introduced the young Michiganite to the financial resources of one
of the world's largest financial trusts.

His unique position as a

participant in two rapidly expanding enterprises (hydroelectric pro
duction and copper mining) was not lost on Ryan as he proceeded to direct
the course of Montana's industrial future during the next five years.
As early as February, 1906, Samuel Hauser learned that Ryan was
interested in developing hydroelectric power from the Missouri River at
Great Falls and transmitting it to Butte and Anaconda.

Hauser was over

extended from the rapid expansion of the previous five years and, with
20. Ibid., pp. 13-14, and Leighton, "Corporate History of the
Montana Power Company," pp. 32, 33.
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construction started on his second dam, he could ill-afford a new
competitor.
In an attempt to stymie interest in the Great Falls properties,
Hauser wrote to H. H. Rogers explaining in detail the progress of the
United Missouri River Company ventures.

Hauser informed the Standard

Oil executives that the formation of the new United Missouri River Power
Company was complete and that the company's second dam at Hauser Lake
would be finished by mid-summer.

Hauser claimed that the Amalgamated

Company held more than $2.5 million in securities of the power companies,
thus hoping to appeal to Rogers' sense of financial commitment to the
United Missouri Company.

Recognizing the link between John Ryan and the

copper trust, Hauser confronted H. H. Rogers with rumors of the formation
a competing power company.
If you or your companies, or anyone backed by you,
should develop the power at Great Falls, it would
cost our company in the consequent depreciation
of its stocks and securities at least 25%; there
fore would depreciate your holdings from $500,000
to $700,000, and I think even more than that.
Remember, that it is your backing and cooperation
that has made the above results possible, and it
was upon this theory that I have in the past based
my negotiations in figuring the consideration and
fixing the price for power to your companies. 2 '
Hauser urged Rogers that, if power was needed at Amalgamated's ismelter
at Great Falls, the United Missouri River Power Company would supply
22
the electricity from the Hauser Lake facility.
21. Emphasis mine. Letter, S. T. Hauser to H. H. Rogers,
February 17, 1906, HP, Box 33, folder 9.
22.

Ibid.
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The degree of collusion between H. H. Rogers and John D. Ryan in
developing the Great Falls properties is difficult to determine.

23

Circumstantial evidence indicates that there was at least tacit agree
ment between the two parties on building facilities at Great Falls as
early as 1906.

By that date, S. T. Hauser had proven the benefits of

electrical operation to the Amalgamated Company.

Indeed, as emphasized

in the previous chapter, Rogers' personal loan to Hauser in 1905 allowed
the elderly Montanan to garner financial support for the second dam and
power plant near Helena.

It is conceivable that, if electricity was to

become the major source of power for the smelters and mines at Butte,
Great Falls and Anaconda^the__state's- largest mining companyj*ould,..want
to guarantee the power's availability at the lowest price possible.
As president of the Anaconda Copper Mining Company in 1906, John
D. Ryan sought to lower the price paid by the company to Hauser's power
firms.

In early December, 1906, Hauser's General Manager, M. H. Gerry,

wrote to the Missouri Power Company president informing him that Ryan
was demanding a price reduction of $10 per horsepower per year,
from $50 per horsepower per annum to $40 per horsepower.

This was a

charge in agreement with the earlier contract of May, 1905.

At the

Anaconda works, however, Ryan wanted to pay only $36 per horsepower per
year for electricity.

Gerry anticipated that the lost revenue would

23. Records of the Anaconda Copper Mining Company and the Montana
Power Company, generally, are not available to the researcher. Some
records of the ACM company have recently been deposited at the Montana
Historical Society in Helena, but the documents have not been processed
and have restrictions placed on them. Records of early transactions of
the Montana Power Company are available only at the Montana Public
Service Comnission.
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total $66,000 annually and he recommended to Hauser that the terms not
be accepted.

But, Gerry also informed Hauser that John Ryan threatened

to develop the Great Falls properties if the new terms were not accepted
within one or two months.
Mr. Ryan stated that he contemplated the develop
ment of the power at Great Falls, that he had
already purchased the site there, that Mr. James
J. Hill would cooperate with him in installing
a new plant and transmit power to Butte and
Anaconda, and that he contemplated doing this
if the terms, as stated above, were not agreed
to. 2 4
Ryan's entrance into the power business worried not only Hauser
and Gerry, but also C. W. Wetmore.

Wetmore may not have believed that

he could block Ryan's plan for developing Great Falls power, but the
Butte Company president obviously tried to lessen the impact from the
new competition.

In 1906, the Butte Electric Company purchased a five-

sixths interest in Ryan's newly-incorporated Great Falls Electric
25
Properties.
At the same time, Wetmore initiated a study of Ryan's
potential business in Great Falls.

The result of the study convinced

power-company financier Wetmore to begin negotiating with the Anaconda
Company president for an industry merger.

26

In a competititive choice between S. T. Hauser and John D. Ryan,
24. Letter, M. H. Gerry to S. T. Hauser, December 1, 1906, HP,
Box 28, folder 39.
25. Leighton, p. 33, and U.S. Federal Power Commission, Reports,
Vol. 4 (1945), p. 230. Not until 1908 did the Butte company complete
the purchase of the remaining one-sixth share of Ryan's business.
26. See Leighton for a discussion of these early negotiations,
pp. 42-43.
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C. W. Wetmore clearly saw that Ryan was the greater threat.

Hauser had

the larger power plants and had invested more money in the actual pro
duction and delivery of electricity.

Yet, John Ryan's position with

Amalgamated convinced Wetmore that he must align his interests with the
owner of the Great Falls properties.

In May, 1906, Wetmore wrote to

H. W. Turner, general manager of the Butte Electric and Power Company,
informing him that he was sending someone to investigate the feasibility
of applying electricity to Amalgamated's hoist works in Butte.

Wetmore

realized that the immediate benefits of such an expansion in the market
would "accrue to the Missouri River Power Company," but that, eventually
the Butte Company's interest would be advanced.
It is certainly for our interest to promote the
application of electricity to hoisting and to
exhaust the Missouri River Company's power as
soon as possible, so as to definitely and finally
dispose of the possibility of their competing
with us. 27
Wetmore made these arrangements with John.Ryan with the obvious inten28
tion of preparing the way for a more formal merger.
Wetmore's initial efforts in 1906 produced five-sixths ownership
in the Great Falls Electric Properties.

Since that company did not

control any water power sites (instead buying its water from the Great
Falls Water Power and Townsite Company), Wetmore was not in control of
27. Letter, C. W. Wetmore to H. W. Turner, May 15, 1906, PSR,
Box 29(1), exhibit 364.
—
28. Ibid. Note that this was in violation of the agreement with
Hauser dated in 1905, although Wetmore did tell Turner that he expected
the relationship to be maintained in good faith and he did have the
investigator notify Gerry that he was coming.

future hydroelectric development in Great Falls.

John Ryan's purchase

of the entire stock of Great Northern Railway magnate James J. Hill in
the Great Falls Water Power and Townsite Company in 1908 awakened a new
interest in the merger by Wetmore.

With control of the Great Falls

power sites, Ryan was in a superior position to negotiate with the Butte
Company.
This unequal situation was immediately evident during the initial
discussions between the two parties in July, 1908.

Ryan stated that he

would consider a sale of part of his interest in the Great Falls proper
ties if he could secure low-priced electricity^for~the~copper"companies. Ryan repeated the threat to Wetmore that he had made to Hauser two years
earlier.

He proposed that if a deal could not be struck that "he and

his associates would develop the Great Falls power, transmit it to Butte,
do their own business, and in this connection he very strongly intimated
29
that they would take on lighting business also."
Wetmore's general
manager, H. W. Turner, took the threat seriously and informed his boss
that "Mr. Ryan and the Amalgamated Company . . . are supreme in this
vicinity and they are fully able to carry out any program they attempt."

30

Turner's observation of John D. Ryan's strength in the Montana
power business was supported by the Cooper and Powelson engineering firm.
Wetmore hired these consultants in 1908,to make an appraisal of the
relative solvency of the three major power interests in the state:
29. Letter, H. W. Turner to Sidney Z. Mitchell, July 18, 1908,
quoted in U.S. Federal Power Commission, Reports, Vol. 4 (1945)»p. 231.
30.

Ibid.

John D. Ryan at Great Falls, S. T. Hauser at Helena, and the Butte
Electric and Power Company owned by Wetmore.

The lengthy report is en

lightening, not only in its assessment of the three significant power
concerns in Montana in 1908, but in its analysis of the future of
hydroelectric production in the state.
Cooper and Powelson's engineers analyzed data submitted by Turner
and determined that the position of S. T. Hauser's United Missouri River
Power Company was tenuous.

Hauser's company had two facilities, one at

Canyon Ferry with a generating capacity of 4,150 horsepower, and one at
Hauser Lake, with a capacity of 7,820.

The latter plant was inoperable

in late 1908, having been damaged by the spring floods of that year.
In addition to these operations, the investigators learned that Hauser
planned to construct a third dam at Wolf Creek with a planned capacity
of 11,170 horsepower.

The engineersalso took note of the steam gener

ating ability of the Missouri River Company interests,butdismissed
its importance as being too costly to operate and productive only of
31
"fractional power."
The facility could not, therefore, be relied
upon to be an asset to the Missouri River Company.
"Fractional" power of this kind is of doubtful
value. By this we do not mean to convey the
idea that it is of no value. It is undoubtedly
advantageous to install powerhouse machinery
and transmission lines for the purpose of
developing some power in excess of that pro
duced by the minimum flow of the stream, but
31. Cooper and Powelson's engineers claimed that the steam plant's
profitability depended upon the cost of fuel, i.e., coal.

how much can profitably be developed depends
upon the cost of coal-produced power in the
district . . .
The engineering analysis of Hauser's firms revealed that the com
panies were heavily in debt.

With the reconstruction of Hauser Dam,

the Missouri River Power Company would have to return at least $32.50
33
per horsepower per annum, just to meet expenses.
Without this charge,
a stockholder in the United Missouri Company could not even sustain his
investment, let alone return a profit.
When put in this form, the weakness of a pur
chaser of stock of the United Missouri River
Power Company in-attempting to-compete with
the Ryan interests is completely exposed.
Who, understanding the conditions, would for
one moment seriously consider purchasing the
stock of the United Missouri River Power Com
pany unless he first acquired the Ryan interests
or became a substantial partner therein.34
S. T. Hauser never had the personal capital to justify the rapid growth
of his hydroelectric facilities at Helena.

Because of his insolvency,

and the experimental nature of the electrical industry in Montana, he
had to support his power plants by charging relatively high prices for
electricity (approximately $50 per annum per horsepower).

Hauser was

not in a position to meet competition from any interest that could
drastically reduce this price for water-power generated electricity.
John D. Ryan's water power sites placed him in a unique position
32. "Report of Cooper and Powelson, Consulting Engineers and
Managers," December 31, 1908, PSR, Box 20, exhibit 78, p. 13.
33.

Ibid., p. 17.

34.

Ibid., pp. 18-19.
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to attack Hauser's artificially high price structure.

Cooper and

Powelson established that Ryan had four possible sites available at
Great Falls; power facilities at these locations would have a combined
generating capacity of 49,320 horsepower.

The attractive feature of

Ryan's position was his ability to market electricity in the Great Falls
area for approximately $16.50 per horsepower and to deliver it to the
35
Butte/Anaconda region for $22.50.
Moreover, the engineers understood
that in 1908, Ryan had secured a contract with the Amalgamated Copper
Company to deliver 10,000 horsepower to Butte and Anaconda at a cost of
$30.00 per horsepower.
From all that has been said above, it must be
apparent that the Ryan interests dominate the
electric power situation in Montana. If the
Great Falls Properties are developed and if
they offer for sale wholesale power in Butte
at from $30.00 to $35.00 per horsepower, the
Missouri River Power Company could ,not compete
and that Company would be forced to seek the
retail field where the return is greater
36
•
•
•
The threat of the Missouri River Company's entrance into the retail
power business, especially in Butte, was of immediate concern to Wet
more's Butte Electric and Power Company.
The engineers' report affirmed in 1908 that the "Butte Company is
37
essentially the retailer of electricity in the State of Montana."
Wetmore's firm was rapidly developing a surplus of power from steam
generating plants in Butte, from hydroelectric facilities on the Madison
35.

Ibid., pp. 10, 19.

37.

Ibid., p. 19.

36.

Ibid., pp. 24-25.

River near *ftorrls~and from a plant on the Big Hole at Divide^

In

addition, Wetmore planned to erect a third plant, dam and reservoir on
the Madison with an expected production capability of 8,400 horsepower.
Despite these advantages, Cooper and Powelson suggested that the Butte
Company was in a vulnerable position.

The company's dominance of the

retail electrical market returned a remarkable profit, one which would
inevitably become attractive to both the Hauser and Ryan interests.
Entrance of either one or both of these concerns, with their inexpensive
water-power generated electricity, would force the Butte Company from
the competitive field.
It would appear therefore that while the stock
holders of both the Missouri River Company and
the Butte Company are weak and could be crushed
by the Ryan interests, the Butte Company from
one point of view is in a weaker position than
the Missouri River Company in the sense that if
the Ryan interests were removed from the field,
the Missouri River Company would have more power
to injure the Butte Company than has the Butte
Company to injure the Missouri River Company.39
Fear of both Montana businesses prompted Wetmore to renew negotiations
towards a consolidation of electrical supply in Montana.
Cooper and Powelson's report urged Wetmore to align his firm with
that of Ryan.

From that point of strength, the two interests could

negotiate for the sale of the Hauser companies.

The consulting engi

neers suggested that Ryan be solicited as an equal partner, holding
38. Ibid., p. 7. See also "Power Development of the Butte Elec
tric and Power Company, Madison River Power Company, and Montana Power
Transmission Company," Montana Power Company (n.p.: 1906).
39.

Cooper and Powelson Report, p. 25.

common stock.

Such a combination of financial and industrial power

would aid immeasurably in influencing state and community leaders and
40
in advancing the interests of the "monopoly."
Less than one month
after submission of the report, Wetmore concluded preliminary negotiations with John Ryan for the merger of their respective power interests.
In May, 1909, the parties arranged a final agreement by which Ryan sold
half interest in the Great Falls Water Power and Townsite Company to
Wetmore in exchange for an equivalent value of Butte Electric and Power
Company stock.

Ryan also became a director and member of the executive
41
committee of the Butte Company.
The Ryan-Wetmore agreement of 1909 fulfilled the Butte Company
president's longstanding desire to consolidate power production and dis
tribution in Montana.

Wetmore first envisioned the scenario unfolding

as an alliance between himself and Hauser in 1904.

The rapid rise of

John D. Ryan, and that individual's tacit support from Amalgamated,
quickly altered Wetmore's design.

The failure of S^.X~»Hausegis-

Hauser Dam in April, 1908, also Influenced Wetmore's projections in that
""
42
it acted, as a catalyst far the subseqtient negotiations wi th Ryan.
40.

Ibid., p. 48.

41.

4 FPC, p. 223, and Leighton, pp. 45-48.

42. Douglas Leighton in his "The Corporate History of The Montana
Power Company," passim, accepts a version of the electric power pro
ducers' consolidation story that first appeared in Federal Power Com
mission documents in the 1940s. That account was derived selectively
from the writings of John D. Ryan, C. W. Wetmore, and Cornelius Kelley.
These men claimed that both Ryan and Wetmore had first considered an
arrangement for consolidation in 1906. Subsequent negotiations and
agreements between the two men were prompted by depreciated securities
following the failure of Hauser Dam in 1908 and by a belief that
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Seeming not only to upset Wetmore's original plan for consolidation,
the failure of the dam also foretold other changes for the three power
interests on the Missouri River in Montana.
One day after the April 14 tragedy, S. T. Hauser received an offer
from C. W. Wetmore for supplemental electricity.

Wetmore agreed to

provide Hauser's companies with 6,000 horsepower for one year at a cost
of $40 per horsepower.

The Butte company president even suggested that

he would be willing to pay half the cost of stringing lines between the
43
rival systems.
Wetmore's motivation in making this offer is difficult
to determine.

No doubt he desired to sell a ready surplus of power that

had increased dramatically with construction of the Madison No. 2 plant.
monopolization of the Missouri's water power was essential to the sur
vival of both individual's companies. Leighton concludes that the
failure of Hauser Dam forced the United Missouri River Power Company to
default on its contracts and forced the Amalgamated Copper Company to
cancel its contracts. [P. 18.]
The scenario that is presented by Leighton is basically correct.
But the situation of S. T. Hauser, who was virtually excluded from the
Leighton account, sheds additional light on the process of consolida
tion. Indeed, Hauser's records indicate that he and Wetmore considered
a power consortium as early as 1904. The entrance of John D. Ryan and
that individual's position with Amalgamated explains the defection of
Wetmore from Hauser to Ryan. As will be shown later, the cancellation
of Amalgamated's power contracts with Hauser was. not predicated solely
on the former governor's unfortunate accident in 1908.
Failure of Hauser Dam in 1908 may have raised the anxiety of all
parties involved in hydroelectric development on the Missouri. But its
greatest affect was on S. T. Hauser's ability to participate in the
planned power monopoly. Failure of the dam was both a catalyst for the
Ryan-Wetmore negotiations and for the withdrawal of S. T. Hauser from
the electric power industry.
43. Letter, S. T. Hauser to M. H. Gerry, May 15, 1908, HP,
Box 33, folder 11.
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Hauser's predicament also provided Wetmore with a legitimate opportunity
to secure a portion of the wholesale electrical supply market in the
Butte/Anaconda area.
C. W. Wetmore's motives in aiding Hauser were not strictly oppor
tunistic.

Butte Electric and Power Company officials expressed genuine

concern for the plight of the Missouri River Company, knowing that a
similar calamity could visit any firm that tampered with the Missouri
River.

Writing to Max Hebgen the day after the failure of Hauser Dam,

Butte Electric General Manager H. W. Turner admitted that:
I really feel sorry for-them, andHiope-thatHtM^
not so bad as reported down here, and I feel that
we should refrain from exulting in the misfortune
of our competitor. No one knows where lightning
may strike next. 44
Turner feared that the failure of one power company's dam could shake
the confidence of consumers in the safety of all water power develop
ments.
Whatever the motives of the Butte Company in offering Hauser
assistance, the aging Helenan had little choice but to accept.

The

1905 power contract between Hauser's companies and Amalgamated held the
power companies libel for not delivering electric power.

The applica

bility of this clause to the loss of Hauser Dam, an event which Hauser
considered an "act of God," was a legality that would require years of
negotiation to settle.

Meanwhile, Hauser had to satisfy the needs of

his primary customer or risk losing Amalgamated to a willing competitor.
44. Letter, H. W. Turner to Max Hebgen, April 15, 1908, PSR,
Box 29(2), exhibit 72.
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The failure of the dam in 1908 left Hauser with only the Canyon Ferry
hydroelectric unit and the auxiliary steam plant in Butte.

While the

first facility could supply some of the necessary power to Amalgamated,
the cost of burning coal in the steam plant was prohibitive.

In such a

situation, the availability of Wetmore's water-power generation was an
attractive option.

Although Hauser worried that lower water would pre

vent the Butte company's plants from generating the anticipated 6,000
horsepower, he claimed that, "it is very important to make the connection and be able to shut down the steam plant."

45

Hauser thanked C. W. Wetmore for his "kind offer" which arrived so
46
soon after the failure of the Missouri River dam.
He delayed the
decision to accept his competitor's power until the end of August of
that year.

By that time, pressure from business associates such as

Henry Seligman forced Hauser to join his United Missouri River Power
Company transmission lines with those of the Butte Electric and Power
47
Company.
During the next two years, the Butte company augmented
48
Hauser's electrical supply at a cost of nearly $400,000.
45. Letter, S. T. Hauser to M. H. Gerry, May 15, 1908, HP, Box 33,
folder 11.
46. Telegram, S. T. Hauser to C. W. Wetmore, April 15, 1908, HP,
Box 33, folder 11.
47. Writing to Hauser in late August, 1908, Seligman urged the
Missouri Company president to accept Wetmore's offer. "This will enable
you to do away with using steam at a loss, and you would be in a posi
tion to take care of your customers while the old dam is being recon
structed. I wish you would give this your very serious consideration."
Letter, Henry Seligman to S. T. Hauser, August 27, 1908, HP, Box 29,
folder 6.
48. Letter, R. S. Condit to S. T. Hauser, June 9, 1910, HP,
Box 30, folder 18.
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The price S. T. Hauser paid to Wetmore's Butte Electric and Power
Company was more than monetary.

A distraught Hauser knew that he was

offering Wetmore the opportunity to consolidate power development in
Montana independent of the Helena-based firms.

In a revealing letter

to D. P. Robinson of the Boston-based Stone and Webster Engineering
Corporation [the firm responsible for the construction of Hauser and
Holter Dams], Hauser noted his true thoughts on the situation in Montana.
The Helenan claimed that, "Immediately after our accident, these parties
commenced taking advantage of our situation and attempted by manipulation to make it impossible for me to rebuild Hauser-Lake Dam.'

4Q

-Since

the Butte interests could not accomplish this alone, Hauser claimed
that Wetmore then turned to an alliance with Ryan as the vehicle in the
50
consolidation drive.
Hauser continued the analysis by explaining his
acceptance of the Wetmore offer to supply power to the United Missouri
River Power Company:
Upon his (Jaretski's) [lawyer for Wetmore] represen
tations, and notwithstanding the bad faith and the
constant effort that had been made from time to
time (at least by their subordinates and managers)
to take our business away from us, I finally agreed
to take what they then represented to be 6000 of
their surplus horsepower, and use it in supplying
our own customers. This 6000 when referred to
their manager, dwindled down to less than 3000. 51
In subsequent correspondence, Hauser suggested that a conspiracy had
49. Letter, S. T. Hauser to D. P. Robinson, April 13, 1909, HP,
Box 33, folder 12.
50.

A reference to the 1909 agreement between Ryan and Wetmore.

51.

Ibid.
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occurred at the time of the Wetmore offer.

Not only had the attorney

for the Butte Company- made overtures to Hauser, but a representative
of Amalgamated had interviewed Seligman in New York and urged "that the
Amalgamated Company be allowed to contract with the Butte Electric Light
52
Company [Butte Electric and Power Company]."
Events following the failure of Hauser Dam convinced S. T. Hauser
that C. W. Wetmore's utility company would continue its efforts to
exclude the United Missouri River Company's major stockholders from a
consolidation of power companies.

Despite repeated denials by Wetmore

and Turner, Hauser remained firm in his belief that the Butte Electric
53
and Power Company intended to "swallow us up."
S. T. Hauser's fears for the future of his hydroelectric business
did not lie only with C. W. Wetmore's Butte Electric and Power Company.
Hauser also anticipated the defection of financial and political sup
porters of the United Missouri River Power Company following the failure
of the Hauser Dam.

William A. Clark, one of the earliest and strongest

contributors to the Missouri River ventures, presented some reservations
52. Letter, S. T. Hauser to W. A. Clark, July 5, 1910, HP,
Box 33, folder 13.
53. Letter, S. T. Hauser to D. P. Robinson, April 9, 1909, HP,
Box 33, folder 12. Even while attempting to ally with John D. Ryan in
1909, C. W. Wetmore tried to allay any fears that Hauser might have over
the consolidation. Referring to the Butte Company's proposed contract
for power with, by that time, the relatively small Heinze operation,
Wetmore stated that, "We, Hauser and ourselves, have agreed that neither
will interfere with any customers." Hie instructed H. W. Turner to defer
negotiations with Heinze and to "observe this agreement strictly."
Wetmore sent a copy of this telegram to Hauser. Telegram, C. W. Wetmore
to H. W. Turner, April 17, 1909, HP, Box 29, folder 33.

-
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to Hauser after the collapse of the dam.

Failure of the United Missouri

Company's dam caused Clark to worry about his own small structure on the
Clark's Fork River, near Missoula.

Clark requested and received from

Hauser the use of General Manager Gerry for an inspection trip to the
Missoula damsite.

Having been reassured that this plant would not fail,

Clark turned his attention to the problems near Helena.
The Montana senator was particularly concerned that the potential
Ryan/Wetmore alliance might cause the Missour River Company serious
problems.

Raising the issue of more ngtuf# disasters, Clark suggested

that:
If we could make some arrangements and get out of
the Missouri River business on an equitable basis,
. . . it might be well to do so, as we have had a
very unfortunate accident there already, and pos
sibly others might follow. 54
Hauser urged his associate not to succumb to the pressures of a "force[d]
55
consolidation" without first hearing from his "friends."
But Clark
clearly had doubts about the financial legitimacy of the hydroelectric
power business and feared a battle with Ryan and Amalgamated Copper
Company.

He suggested to Hauser that the copper trust may have been

behind the moves for electrical consolidation. 56

Having faced the

company during the 1900 election, Clark was not anxious to do so again.
54. Letter, W. A. Clark to S. T. Hauser, June 13, 1908, HP,
Box 29, folder 18.
55. Telegram, S. T. Hauser to W. A. Clark, June 12, 1908, HP,
Box 33, folder 11.
56. Letter, W. A. Clark to S. T. Hauser, June 13, 1908, HP,
Box 29, folder 18.
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W. A. Clark was not the only Hauser supporter to express concern
over the failure of the Missouri River dam in 1908.

At the time that

the Hauser Dam collapsed, the Amalgamated Copper Company owned twentyone percent share in the Hauser organized power companies.

These shares

had been negotiated directly through the offices of H. H. Rogers, Amalgamated's chief officer.

The failure of the dam during the spring floods

caused the company to look more seriously at the nature of this invest
ment.

Of more importance in Amalgamated's decision to reassess its

position was the obvious intention of John D. Ryan to develop the Great
57
Falls property. —Recognizing both influences,-S.- T. Hauser made over-~
tures to H. H. Rogers in an effort to commit the copper trust to the
reconstruction of the Missouri River dam.
In June, 1908, Hauser addressed a letter to Rogers imploring the
New York financier to respond to a director's call for $100*000.

As a

lever for this request, Hauser agreed to supply the copper companies at
Butte with 17,000 horsepower at $35 per horsepower.

This generation

would begin within ten months when the Hauser Dam would be reconstructed.
Hauser claimed that within another year the United Missouri River Com
pany's third dam at Wolf Creek would be operating, augmenting the power
.
58
system.
Hauser received no direct response from Rogers on this matter.
r

One month later, in July, 1908, Hauser again wrote to Rogers to voice
57.
p. 47.

Leighton, "The Corporate History of Montana Power Company,"

58. Letter, S. T. Hauser to H. H. Rogers, June 9, 1908, HP,
Box 33, folder 11.
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suspicions about the activities of Amalgamated 1 s general manager, John
D. Ryan.

Hauser repeated the threat that Ryan had made to M. H. Gerry

concerning the need for a reduction in the price of power and the pos
sibility of a competing company pushing hydroelectric facilites at
Great Falls.

Obviously unsure of Rogers' role in this affair, Hauser

hoped to discern the New Yorker's true feelings.
Now, Mr. Rogers, I have been unable to see you for
four months; therefore I do not believe that you
endorsed, or even encouraged the efforts of the
representatives of the Amalgamated Company to
destroy our property and carry out the threat of
the managing director.*"
Hauser reminded Rogers that the "Montana stockholders" were the
"staunchest friends" of Amalgamated and that they had often aided the
industrial giant. 6 ^

Hauser urged Rogers to exert the influence neces

sary to retain the support of Amalgamated for the Missouri River Com
pany's interests.

Hauser added that he was "proud to say that you have

always promptly stopped any unreasonable and unfair treatment in the
past."^
H. H. Rogers had befriended Hauser in the past, but was not in a
position to do so again in 1908.

After suffering a physical breakdown

in 1907, Rogers' ability to manage the multitudinous affairs of the
Standard Oil Company was limited.

By June, 1908, he was in semi-

59. Letter, S. T. Hauser to H. H. Rogers, July 4, 1908, HP,
Box 33, folder 11.
60.

Ibid.

61.

Ibid.

retirement and, as events developed, had less than ten months to live.
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Answers to Hauser's inquiries of the copper trust came in late
July, 1908.

They were less than satisfactory.

In a letter to Hauser's

financial supporter Henry Seligman, Amalgamated Vice-President F. P.
Addicks stated that a more "valid assurance" was necessary before the
company could commit additional funds to the Missouri River Company r s
ventures.

This guarantee could be shown by either subscribing enough

funds for the reconstruction of Hauser Dam, or by having the completed
dam once more in operation.

In a terse postscript, Addicks informed

Seligman that, "I have sent a copy of this letter to Governor Hauser."
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S. T. Hauser may have suspected the defection of the Amalgamated
Copper Company

from his hydroelectric enterprises.

He did not, how

ever, know that in October, 1908, Amalgamated representatives had signed
a contract with John D. Ryan for the delivery, of electric power from the
Great Falls Water Power and Townsite Company's new dam at Rainbow Falls.
The Ryan agreement with Amalgamated also allowed the Anaconda Company
president to purchase the copper trust's shares in the United Missouri
64
River Power Company.
As if to anticipate the assumption of control
of Hauser's properties by the Ryan interests, this new contract required
62. Harpers Weekly, "Henry H. Rogers: Captain of Industry,"
May 29, 1909, Vol. 53, No. 2736, p. 9.
63. Letter, F. P. Addicks to Henry Seligman, July 29, 1908, HP,
Box 29, folder 31.
64. Ryan probably exercised this
Missouri River Power Company's listing
Addicks, Amalgamated's vice-president,
"Listing of Stockholders," December 6,

option. However, the United
of stockholders showed F. P.
holding these securities. See
1909, HP, Box 63, folder 19.
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Amalgamated to renew its contracts with the Missouri River Power Company
and the Helena Power-Transmission Company, or its successors, at the
65
contract's expiration.
John D. Ryan's actions in 1908 and 1909 indicated his intention to
control the production and distribution of hydroelectric power in Mon
tana.

While not in possession of a majority stock in Hauser's companies,

Ryan's replacement of H. H. Rogers in the United Companies did allow the
younger capitalist to control one of Hauser's principal sources of
funds.

Ryan's position as president of Anaconda Copper Company added to

his ability to direct the course of consolidation after 1908.

fifi

65. Contract between Great Falls Water Power and Townsite Company
and Amalgamated, October 15, 1908, PSR, Box 43, exhibit 7.
66. John D. Ryan later explained his involvement in the hydro
electric industry as beginning in 1908 with the failure of Hauser Lake
Dam. Ryan claimed that his responsibilities to Amalgamated forced him'
to locate a reliable source of cheap electric power. When Hauser's dam
collapsed in 1908, Ryan asserted that H. H. Rogers became disenchanted
with hydroelectric power generation in Montana. He offered to sell Ryan
Amalgamated's interests in the United Missouri Company and Ryan accepted.
In addition, Amalgamated agreed to contract with Ryan for power from the
prospective Rainbow Dam.
While this scenario is partly true, it is clear that John Ryan
anticipated the development of water power in Great Falls as early as
1906. He had challenged both Hauser and Wetmore with the possibility
of competition,and his alliance with Wetmore in 1909 confirmed these
earlier intentions. Evidencing Ryan's plan to assume control of hydro
electric production in Montana is the contract modification signed by
his Great Falls Water Power Company and Amalgamated's Washoe Copper Com
pany in July, 1909. At that time, the October, 1908 contract was al
tered to require the consent of both parties to a renewal of a power
contract with either the Missouri River Power Company or the Helena
Power Transmission Company. See "Contract Between Great Falls Water
Power and Townsite Company and Washoe Copper Company," July 30, 1909,
PSR, Box 43, exhibit 9. See also Letter, John D. Ryan to H. M. Cole,
May 1, 1923, PSR, Box 43, exhibit 3.
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The collapse of Hauser Dam on April 14, 1908, marked the start of
S. T. Hauser 1 s economic ruin.

Heavily in debt for construction of two

dams, a transmission line and a steam auxiliary plant in Butte, Hauser
was taxed to garner sufficient funds to reconstruct the wrecked facility
or to complete the building of his third hydroelectric plant.

Even had

Hauser Dam not been destroyed in 1908, it would have been questionable
whether S. T. Hauser could have succeeded in his power ventures.

In

1908, Hauser owned the largest single block of stock in the United
Missouri River companies. 6 * His heavy indebtedness suggests that the
old capitalist was extended financially.

It would have been difficult

for him to have continued with construction of Holter Dam without con
tinued support from his major investors.
The appearance of John D. Ityan removed one of those prominent
financial backers.

In the coming months, it was critical that S. T.

Hauser retain the support of other important investors.
Hauser Dam made this task extremely difficult.

The failure of

In effect, the dam's

collapse acted as a catalyst to propel the merger of Hauser's two oppo
nents.

The spring waters that washed his "durable and substantial dam"

down the channel of the Missouri River drowned hopes that he might align
himself with the financial forces of John D. Ryan, C. W. Wetmore, or the
Amalgamated Copper Company.

The future of S. T. Hauser's hydroelectric

enterprise lay with the wreckage of Hauser Dam and it would be the
Amalgamated Copper Company, under the leadership of John D. Ryan, that
would direct the succeeding course of events.
67. Letter, William P. Gower to S. T. Hauser, April 27, 1908, HP,
Box 29, folder 29.

CHAPTER IV

A COMBINATION OF FORCES:

THE BUTTE SYNDICATE

C. W. Wetmore's purchase of half interest in John D. Ryan's Great
Falls properties formed an alliance that threatened Samuel T. Hauser's
electric power interests.

Consolidation of the Wetmore and Ryan concerns

presaged an assault on the valuable water-power facilities and sites near
the city of Helena.

Of particular concern to Hauser were Ryan's plan to

construct the large hydroelectri c faci1ity at ^Rainbow Fal1s (Great falls r
Montana) and the possibility that the aging Helenan might lose his lucra
tive contracts with the Amalgamated Copper Company.

S. T. Hauser was

unable to prevent either event.
On May 19, 1909, Henry H. Rogers died at his New York home.
His death forced a shift in leadership in the Standard Oil Company
and resulted in the appointment of new management for the conglomerate's
subsidiary companies. John D. Ryan was selected to head the Amalgamated
Copper Company. With control of the major industrial consumer of elec
tricity in Montana, Ryan's Great Falls power sites inevitably increased
in value.
John Ryan quickly capitalized on his attractive position. In 1909,
his Great falls Electric Company began construction of the dam andc elec
trical generating facility on the Missouri River at Rainbow Falls. The
project proceeded to conclusion in record time and was ready for power
production in late summer of 1910. As reported in 1913 by Max Hebgen
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(then the general manager of the new Montana Power Company), the Rainbow
Dam facility was "the first large development . . . made at this point.
The plant consisted of a low diversion dam, which was located above the
falls.

Water was funneled through a fifteen-foot penstock to generators

situated below the falls.
exceeded 25,000 horsepower.

The electric generating capacity of the plant
2

While preparing the Rainbow hydroelectric plant for operation,
John Ryan also considered the requirements for transmitting electricity
from Great Falls to Amalgamated's mines and smelters at Butte and Ana
conda.

Obviously, a transmission line would have to be erected from

Great Falls to the existing power line at Helena.

One option for Ryan

and Wetmore was to lease both the Helena/Butte line and the line from
Butte to Anaconda, from S. T. Hauser's United Missouri River Power Com
pany.

Max Hebgen, representing the Wetmore interests, expressed the

need to either lease the Hauser line or to construct a duplicate line.
Hebgen feared that if Hauser lost the Amalgamated contracts for power
and if the Butte Company assumed them, then the latter firm would need
the availability of a pole line from Helena to Butte, with another line
tying in from Great Falls.

3

John D. Ryan's representatives worried about these same transmission
problems.

The Ryan half of the power combination was particularly

1.

Max Hebgen, "Hydroelectric Development in Montana," p. 797.

2.

Ibid.

3. Letter, Max Hebgen to H. W. Turner, October 14, 1909, PSR,
Box 37, exhibit 403.

concerned that Hauser's people not be served notice that the Amalgamated
Company intended to terminate the United Missouri River Power Company's
contracts.

They feared that if Hauler knew that he would lose Amalga-

mated's business, he might attempt to channel his electrical power into
the retail market in Butte.

4

As one Ryan official noted, "The situation

is a little delicate.

S. T. Hauser probably knows he will lose Anaconda
5
business but doubtless thinks he can hold Butte contracts."
Either

erecting a duplicate line to Butte and Anaconda, or leasing part of the
Hauser system would invariably confirm the fact that Hauser would lose
business.

As a possible alternative, Ryan's spokesman suggested that,

"We might buy the Butte-Anaconda line and Anaconda sub-station and in
February and March quietly build our own line." 6

Reportedly, both

H. W. Turner and Hebgen favored this approach to the problem.
The arrangement was not satisfactory to S. T. Hauser, however, and
John Ryan was never able to effect an acquisition of the United Missouri
River Company's transmission lines.

Ryan's failure retarded the initia

tion of power development from the Rainbow Falls plant, but did not
prevent its eventual transmission of electricity over a new pole line
to Butte and Anaconda—completed in 1910.*
4. This was a course that had been rejected in the Hauser-Turner
agreement of 1905.
5. Telegram, R. S. Alley to John D. Ryan, October 19, 1909, PSR,
Box 43, exhibit 188.
6.

Ibid.

7. Letter, John D. Ryan to C. W. Wetmore, July 19, 1910, PSR,
Box 43, exhibit 116.
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While Ryan constructed Rainbow Dam and plotted with Wetmore on ways
to deliver power to Butte and Anaconda, Samuel Hauser became increasingly
concerned over the fate of his power interests.

Hauser was not ignorant

of the designs of the Ryan/Wetmore combination.

Writing to M. H. Gerry

in January, 1909, Hauser explained that "these same people [Butte Elec
tric and Power Company] are in with Ryan and are figuring to secure as
much [sic] of our customers as possible."

Hauser added that "Addicks

and Ryan have succeeded in making as Toole said 'the young old man' a
8
heap of trouble." The possibility of a Cancellation of his contracts
with the Amalgamated Copper Company-and the consequent loss of business
to the Ryan/Wetmore combination threatened the financial structure of
Hauser's power companies.

Aggravating the difficulties for the Helena

water-power magnate were construction and financial problems in rebuild
ing Hauser Dam and in completing plans for a third power facility at
Wolf Creek (Holter Dam).
A rnyriad of difficulties faced S. T. Hauser between 1908 and 1910.
Chief among these was a problem that confronted Hauser after the collapse
of the second dam.

Rising costs for construction of Holter Dam forced

the former governor's continual attention to the project's development.
Inherent sluggishness in the project at Wolf Creek, coupled with struc
tural and financial problems at both that facility and the reconstruc
tion site of Hauser Dam, caused a serious drain on the monetary and
personal resources of Hauser in the months following April, 1908.
8. Letter, S. T. Hauser to M. H. Gerry, January 24, 1909, HP,
Box 33, folder 12.
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The principal difficulty in proceeding with the Holter Dam project
was acquisition of the requisite capital.

In July, 1908, Hauser's

Capital City Improvement Company (the subsidiary firm that received the
federal permit for the dam) engaged the services of the Stone and Webq
ster Engineering Corporation for the Holter development.
Stone and
Webster's engineering experts estimated that the cost of construction
of the dam and power plant would be $1.9 million.

This figure was

challenged by Hauser's general manager, M. H. Gerry, and by the Missouri
River Company's consulting engineer, William de la Barre.

Both men

estimated that the cost of constructing the 110-foot high concrete dam
and 20,000 horsepower generating plant would reach only $1.4 million.
The half-million dollar difference was sufficient to cause a financiallyplagued S. T. Hauser uncertainty about the outcome of the projects. 1 ^
Of greater concern to Hauser was his inability to continue construc
tion of the dam once the work had begun in the spring of 1909.

Stone

9. Letter, William R. Barbour to S. T. Hauser, July 11, 1908, HP,
Box 29. folder 32. The Stone and Webster Engineering Corporation was
involved in numerous electric power development projects at the turn of
the century. For a list of the company's holdings see Electric Power
Development in the United States, U.S. Congress, Senate Doc. No. 316,
part 3, 64th Cong., 1st sess. (1916), p. 465.
10. Hauser was particularly concerned with the cost of the Wolf
Creek project in light of the financial strain caused by the Hauser Dam
failure. In a letter to D. P. Robinson, Stone and Webster Company presi
dent, in October, 1908, Hauser claimed that while he realized "that the
unfortunate loss of one dam will almost compel the expenditure of money
on the side of extra precaution, . . . I want something specific and
definite as to your reasons for changing the plans and making the extra
expenditures." Apparently, the higher figures were reluctantly accepted
by Hauser, since Stone and Webster began work on the Wolf Creek project
early in 1909. See Letter, Hauser to D. P. Robinson, October 27, 1908,
HP, Box 33, folder 11.
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and Webster Company President D. P. Robinson explained to Hauser in
May, 1909, that, if only he (Hauser) could commit $200,000 immediately,
the dam could be completed and operating by October, 1910.^

As work on

the Holter Dam continued during the summer of 1909, new demands taxed
the financial resources of S. T. Hauser.

In a series of letters to

S. T. Hauser in November, 1909, President Robinson anticipated that the
funds then available to him for construction of the dam would not permit
12
its completion.
Consequently, Hauser faced a possible shutdown and
was forced to request the Stone and Webster Company to use only the
13
money then available in an effort to prepare the dam for abandonment.—
In late December, Robinson prepared to cease operations at the Wolf
Creek site, but, in early January, Hauser reversed his decision to slow
the work effort.

He requested that Robinson "proceed with the Capital

City work on the basis that funds will be available as required to carry
14
the work on continuously until its final completion."
S. T. Hauser's ability to proceed with the construction of Holter
Dam was founded on the anticipated merger of the United Missouri River
Power Company with the Capital City Improvement Company.

Hauser and

his associates anticipated floating a new bond issue soon after the
11. Letter, D. P. Robinson to S. T. Hauser, May 25, 1909, HP,
Box 30, folder 3.
12. See Letters, D. P. Robinson to S. T. Hauser, November 22, 29,
December 20, 1909, HP, Box 30, folder 3.
13. Letter, D. P. Robinson to S. T. Hauser, November 13, 1909,
HP, Box 30, folder 3.
14. Letter, D. P. Robinson to S. T. Hauser, January 6, 1910, HP,
Box 30, folder 17.
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merger was effected.

In addition, the power companies began new efforts

to control construction costs.

Hauser and General Manager M. H. Gerry

scrutinized more carefully various authorizations for purchase of
15
materials and payment of expenses.
Hauser and Gerry tried to restrict
the engineers at the construction site.to expenses of no more than
$50,000 monthly during the spring of 1910.

Yet, Stone and Webster's

cost estimates consistently exceeded that amount during the period."'®
In July, 1910, D. P. Robinson acknowledged Hauser's request to keep
expenditures within the $50,000 a month ceiling for the last quarter of
1910, but estimated that his company would have to exceed the figure
in order to complete construction at the Wolf Creek siteJ*
S. T. Hauser's difficulties with financing the Holter Dam project
were serious and threatening to the former governor's economic stability.
Coupled with additional monetary and structural problems at the Hauser
Dam reconstruction site, Hauser's business problems were acute.
Rehabilitation of the Hauser Dam facility encountered serious
delays from its start.

The Stone and Webster engineering firm received

the contract for the dam reconstruction project in January, 1909.

As

15. M. H. Gerry wrote to Hauser in March, 1910, charging that
"owing to the excessive expenditures now being made by the Stone and
Webster Engineering Corporation for the account of this Company [Capital
City Improvement Company], . . . it becomes impossible for this office
to make any approval of expenditures for the account of construction at
Camp Holter." Letter, M. H. Gerry to S. T. Hauser, March 24, 1910, HP,
Box 30, folder 9.
16. The cost figures were May, $86,900; June, $82,000; July,
$69,000. Letter, D. P. Robinson to S. T. Hauser, May 12, 1910, HP,
Box 30, folder 17.
17. Letter, D. P. Robinson to Hauser, July 12, 1910, HP, Box 30,
folder 17.

102

early as March of that year, M. H. Gerry wrote to Hauser informing the
United Missouri Company president that very little work had been accom
plished at the site.
No work of any permanent nature had been started and
the entire results thus far were in the nature of
camp, equipment and preliminary construction., As I
have never received any plans nor engineering infor
mation regarding this work, I have been unable to
form any opinion as to what was contemplated or how l f i
the work could be carried to a successful conclusion. 1 ®
What bothered Gerry more than the fact that he could see no progress
on the project was that it appeared to him that much of the work force
was being laid off until after the high-water season had passed.

The

United Missouri Company general manager drew no conclusions from these
19
observations, but he was obviously disturbed by the events.
While M. H. Gerry entertained doubts as to the efficiency of the
Stone and Webster managers, he was more skeptical of the quality of the
Missouri River facility's engineering design.

Throughout the 1909 con

struction season at the Hauser Lake site, Gerry expressed particular
concern that the new concrete dam was not designed to withstand high
water similar to that of 1908.

Gerry evidenced most concern about the

capacity of the spillway at the new facility.

He calculated that the

design of the spillway did not allow sufficient water to be withdrawn
from the lake during a period of high spring run-off.

Such a deficiency

would place added pressure on the dam and might cause the structure to
18. Letter, M. H. Gerry to S. T. Hauser, March 16, 1910, HP,
Box 30, folder 5.
19.

Ibid.
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collapse.

Stone and Webster President D. P. Robinson replied to this

criticism by emphasizing to Hauser that such a circumstance could only
happen if the flashboards on top of the dam were not removed (allowing
water to overflow the dam) or if Canyon Ferry Dam failed.
claimed that even

Robinson

the failure of the upriver dam would not insure the

rise of Hauser Lake to the level necessary to place inordinate stress
20
on the new dam.
At the basis of M. H. Gerry's distrust of Stone and Webster com
pany's work at Holter Dam and Hauser Dam was his doubt of the engineer
ing firm's commitment to the projects.In January, 1910, D. P. Robinson
informed Hauser that the bedrock under the proposed Holter Dam might be
unstable.

Gerry immediately responded to the claim by charging the

engineering firm president with attempting to delay the project and to
21
raise costs.
Hauser also expressed amazement to Robinson since he
"presumed [that] this question had been settled by you and your engineers
some six months ago—after spending three months in testing and boring
22
the foundation."
Hauser suggested that an inspection team of engineers
be sent to the Wolf Creek site for an examination of the situation.
20. Letter, D. P. Robinson to S» T. Hauser, January 10, 1910, HP,
Box 30, folder 17. M. H. Gerry inherently distrusted the Stone and
Webster engineers. His criticisms of the Hauser Dam design dated from
June, 1909. See letters, D. P. Robinson to S. T. Hauser, June 29, 1909,
D. P. Robinson to J. & W. Seligman and Company, October 6, 1909, D. P.
Robinson to S. T. Hauser, November 11, 1909, all in HP, Box 30, folder 3.
21. Letter, D. P. Robinson to S. T. Hauser, January 26, 1910, HP,
Box 30, folder 17.
22. Letter, S. T. Hauser to D. P. Robinson, January 29, 1910, HP,
Box 33, folder 13.
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An inspection team composed of Gerry and engineers representing
Stone and Webster and A. B. Leach and Company, a major investor in the
project, inspected the Holter Dam facility in February, 1910.

After

lengthy discussions and negotiations, a general concensus as to the
stability of the site's bedrock was reached.
agreed to changes in design that
23
the concrete dam.

M. H. Gerry reluctantly

would add additional reinforcement to

Gerry's skepticism of the Stone and Webster Company's design
changes at Holter Dam was not predicated on his lack of concern for the
structure's stability.

Indeed, as has been shown, he questioned the

engineering firm's failure to provide for possible record high water
at the Hauser Dam facility.

Instead, Gerry's lack of faith was predi

cated on Stone and Webster's motivation for proposing the design changes.
Even after the February agreement had been concluded, Gerry reported to
Hauser that the consulting engineers continued in their efforts to
"discredit the foundation rock" at the Holter Dam site.^

The United

Missouri Company general manager was particularly concerned that Stone
and Webster's workers were blasting the bedrock with excessive charges
of dynamite and causing large cracks in the foundation.

He added, "I

find that they are also making up lists of the little cracks and

leakage

23. Letters, Charles T. Main, Henry Herrick and M. S. Parker to
M. H. Gerry, February 9, 1910, HP, Box 30, folder 17; M. H. Gerry to
S. T. Hauser, February 11, 1910 and February 12, 1910, HP, Box 30,
folder 9.
24. Letter, M. H. Gerry to S. T. Hauser, April 9, 1910, HP,
Box 30, folder 9.
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seams near the surface and evidently endeavoring to. carry on the fight."

25

Other problems with the Stone and Webster company plagued M. H.
Gerry.

A year earlier, in February, 1909, he reported to Hauser that

the labor practices of the Boston-based engineering firm had been de26
clared "unfair" by the Montana Federation of Labor.
Referring to a
written notice that had been published by the union, Gerry reported
that the low wage scale ($1.75 per day for a laborer) and the company's
policy of hiring foreign labor formed the basis for the charges.

Gerry

was particularly concerned that this situation not cause a problem for
the United Missouri Company's Butte and Anaconda customers.

Strong

unionism in both industrial communities could prevent the sale of elec
tricity from the Hauser-owned plants to mines and smelters.

Gerry re

minded Hauser that, "We have gotten along here ever since our plants
were started without strikes in the midst of all kinds of bitter labor
controversies and disputes; at the same time we have succeeded in keep
ing the wage scale at a moderate figure and all of our men out of the
27
union excepting those in Butte."
Supporting Gerry's complaints about the Stone and Webster company's
labor controversy were suspicions that workers at the two dam sites were
25.

Ibid.

26. The Montana State Federation of Labor was organized in 1894,
and labeled the Montana Trades and Labor Council. A few years later,
the name was changed to the Montana State Federation of Labor.
The Federation was an independent union that chartered other unions,
primarily those involving lumber, sawmill, and brick-making workers.
The Federation was affiliated with the American Federation of Labor in
1907. Montana State Federation of Labor, Yearbook: Golden Jubilee:
1894-1944 (n.p. 1944), p. 53.
27. Letter, M.H. Gerry to S.T. Hauser, February 2, 1909, HP, Box
29, folder 44.
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sabotaging the plants.

In March, 1910, Gerry wrote to Hauser and en

closed a confidential report from a private detective firm located in
Helena.

N. P. Walters, of the firm of the same name, reported to the

general manager that one of his (Walters) "operatives" had overheard a
barroom conversation between two employees of Stone and Webster.

Both

men detailed situations in which their foremen had halted work at
Hauser Dam which was subsequently damaged by high water.

Before with

drawing from the area, the foremen ordered their men to retrieve any
materials that belonged to the construction company.

The Walters'

"operative" related that both Stone and Webster employees believed that,
with a bit more effort, the high water would not have caused any damage
to the dam.
These men all talked as if there was something
crooked in connection with the Stone and Webster
contract, and they had an idea that the Stone
and Webster concern allow these accidents pur
posely in order to eventually discourage those
who are putting up the money for the work and
to cause them to discontinue putting up money,
and the Stone and Webster Company would then
bring it about so that they will get control
of the dam. 28
The two employees of the engineering firm had information that Stone
and Webster had attempted to overrun costs at a dam near Seattle in an
effort to gain control of that venture.

29

Without orders from Gerry, Detective Walters instructed his
Operative #7 to obtain employment at the Hauser Dam site, under the
28. Letter, M. H. Gerry to S. T. Hauser, March 18, 1910, HP,
Box 30, folder 18.
29.

Ibid.
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guise of a carpenter.

In a detailed report to his employer a few weeks

later, the agent related numerous instances of waste and inefficiency
at the construction site.

The pseudo-carpenter detailed how good lum

ber, nails and spikes were often discarded as scrap, and how tools were
often dispensed from the company shop without any attempt to account for
them.

Operative #7 explained that there was little planning of work at
30
the site and that much time was lost in the lack of coordinated tasks.
General Manager Gerry claimed no solicitation or prior knowledge of
these reports, but wasted little time in forwarding them to S. T. Hauser
for the power company president's review.
As construction delays and design problems continued and costs rose,
M. H. Gerry became more certain that the Stone and Webster Company's
loyalty to S. T. Hauser's project was suspect.

Gerry clearly believed

that the company's president, D. P. Robinson, was surreptitiously pro
moting the interests of the Ryan/Wetmore combination.

As early as

November 6, 1908, Gerry informed Hauser that Robinson had met with John
D. Ryan in Great Falls and had taken a copy of the Holter Dam plans with
31
him.
Further evidencing the duplicity of the arrangement between
Robinson and Ryan was the hiring of Henry M. Herrick in February, 1910,
as a consulting engineer to Stone and Webster at the Hauser projects.
Supposedly Herrick also was employed by the Great Falls Power Company.
30.

Ibid.; Special Report of Operative #7, March 16, 1910.

31. Letter, M. H. Gerry to S. T. Hauser, November 6, 1908, HP,
Box 29, folder 23.
32. Letter, S. T. Hauser to the Board of Directors, February 23,
1910, HP, Box 33, folder 13.
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As Gerry remarked in a confidential letter to Hauser in April, 1910,
Herrick seemed to be involved in the most sensitive discussions with
33
Robinson and other Stone and Webster officials.
By mid-April, 1910, M. H. Gerry had concluded that the actions of
the Stone and Webster Company were cause for concern.

Repeated changes

in design by the firm threatened to bankrupt the United Missouri River
Power Company.

Gerry claimed that Robinson's changes in design had not
34
"been suggested in good faith but rather for an ulterior purpose."
As Gerry conceded to Hauser, the general manager had very little control
over the costs or the production rate at either-the Holter Dam-or-Hauser
Dam sites.

Gerry issued an ultimatum to Hauser that he (Gerry) be given

more control over the project, or "I must ask that I be entirely re
lieved of all responsibility."^
M. H. Gerry did not quit S. T. Hauser's employ in April, 1910.

He

continued to serve as Hauser's representative in Helena in part because
of the decision to restrict the Stone and Webster Company's expenses
to $50,000 per month.

Nevertheless, the inability of the power company

to cap the mounting expenditures of its contractors continued to distress
Gerry.
S. T. Hauser shared some of his manager's reservations about the
Stone and Webster Company and their progress on the two dams.

In a

33. Letter, M. H. Gerry to S. T. Hauser, April 12, 1910, HP,
Box 30, folder 9.
34.

Ibid.

35. Letter, M. H. Gerry to Hauser, April 13, 1910, HP, Box 30,
folder 9.
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letter to D. P. Robinson in January, 1910, Hauser noted that he
(Robinson) had "selected an engineer that is now in charge of, and is an
36
*
employee of the Great Falls Power Co."
While acknowledging Robinson's
perogative to hire whomever he chose, Hauser requested the Stone and
37
Webster president to try to keep "within the family."
Hauser may have been concerned about the activities and inactivity
of the engineering firm's representatives, but he recognized the need
to placate the interest of all parties in his power development ventures.
A concurrent attempt to reconstruct Hauser Dam and to erect a third
hydroelectric facility on the Missouri River at Wolf Creek required more
38
than $5 million worth of investment capital.
To secure this money,
Hauser necessarily had to woo various financial interest.
During the late winter of 1909, Hauser counseled M. H. Gerry to
exercise moderation in his remarks about the Stone and Webster
36. Letter, S. T. Hauser to D. P. Robinson, January 29, 1910,
HP, Box 33, folder 17.
37.

Ibid.

38. It is extremely difficult to determine Hauser's estimated costs
for either reconstructing the Hauser Dam or rebuilding Holter Dam. At
one point, Hauser believed that Hauser Dam would cost approximately
$500,000 to reconstruct. In June, 1910, D. P. Robinson of Stone and
Webster Engineering Corporation informed Hauser that the price tag had
soared to more than $2.5 million. Similarly, the cost of Holter Dam
varied from $1.7 million to more than $3 million. The best estimate of
Hauser's financial predicament is revealed in a letter that he wrote to
his son in May, 1910. In that lengthy missive, the elder Hauser con
fessed that both Stone and Webster and the financial house of A. B.
Leach and Company had invested more than $5 million in the "Helena
Enterprises." See letter, S. T. Hauser to S. T. Hauser, Jr., May 14,
1910, HP, Box 33, folder 13. See also letter, S. T. Hauser to Isaac
Seligman, May 18, 1909, HP, Box 33, folder 13; and letter, D. P. Robin
son to S. T. Hauser, June 3, 1910, HP, Box 30, folder 17.
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Engineering Corporation.

That firm's monetary connections on Wall Street

had helped Hauser secure much of the New York City capital that he needed
for the dams.

Hauser acknowledged the engineering firm's "shortcomings"

but stated that it had supported him "in the face of powerful, if not
39
actual enemies."
In the midst of the controversy over the design of
the dams and their increasing cost in the spring of 1910, Hauser again
rose to the defense of the Stone and Webster Company.
In a letter to his son, Samuel T. Hauser, Jr., the former governor
evidenced sheer expediency.

He admitted that "Stone and Webster's
40
representati ves -had made some- fearful-mi stakes r"
Oesp i te these -errors-*

the elder Hauser believed that the firm's commitment to the projects was
solid.

In a complicated series of negotiations, Henry Seligman, A. B.

Leach and Charles A. Stone (representing Stone and Webster) had pledged
$1.75 million to the completion of Hauser Dam.

In addition, Stone and

Webster had offered an additional $1.3 million to Hauser.

Hauser ex

plained to his son that finishing the reconstruction project was vital
to the successful prosecution of the Holter Dam facility since Leach
would offer $12 million worth of bonds for sale on the London market
41
once the old dam had been reconstructed.
Hauser expressed concern to his son that General Manager Gerry's
dislike for Stone and Webster's representatives contributed to an
39. Letter, S. T. Hauser to M. H. Gerry, March 22, 1909, HP,
Box 33, folder 12.
40. Letter, S. T. Hauser to S. T. Hauser, Jr., May 14, 1910,
HP, Box 33, folder 13.
41.

Ibid.

attitude that the dams could not be built.

He asked that all concerned

recognize the "desperate situation that we are now in.

Hauser implied

that if professional and personal differences between the engineers
could not be resolved then at least an appearance of concensus must be
fostered.
In conclusion, my boy, I will say that you may read
this letter to n\y friend John S'. M. Neal, Gerry's
partner, and tell him that he should at least buy
the ice to keep Gerry's head cool and make, him co
operate and realize that the firm of Stone and
Webster have no personal feeling in the matter
whatever, and that business is business and demands
the suppression of personal feeling to the end of
success. 43
Hauser anticipated that by drawing on the financial resources of Stone
and Webster, he would inevitably tie their fortunes and prospects for
success to his own.
S. T. Hauser's approach to securing the backing of Stone and Web
ster and other financial concerns was consistent with his earlier
alliances with H. H. Rogers and Amalgamated Copper Company.

Character

istically, the aging Montanan would not acknowledge the possibility
that the successful completion of Hauser or Holter hydroelectric plants
would not necessarily benefit him.

The threat of losing the lucrative

Amalgamated contracts once John D. Ryan's Rainbow Dam was complete did
not deter the formidable gentleman.

Hauser continued to press for co

operation, financial control, and increased investment in the United
Missouri River Power Company projects during late spring and early
42.

Ibid.

43.

Ibid.

summer of 1910.

At the same time, Ryan and Charles Wetmore pursued

their plans to complete the Rainbow project at Great Falls and to trans
mit electrical power to the Amalgamated mines and smelters at Butte and
Anaconda.

45

The likelihood that the completion of Rainbow Dam would mean a
termination of United Missouri River Power Company contracts with Amal
gamated did not escape S. T. Hauser.

In April, 1909, he requested

M. H. Gerry to visit the site of the Great Falls hydroelectric plant
46
and to report on that project.
In September of that year, William A.
Clark informed Hauser that John D. Ryan had assured him (Clark) that
the Rainbow plant would replace the Hauser-owned facilities as a sup
plier of power to Amalgamated.

Ryan claimed that the new dam and gen

erators would produce 28,000 horsepower of electricity, 8,000 horsepower
of which would be furnished to the city of Great Falls and the balance
44. One of the reasons for consolidating the subsidiary power
companies under the United Missouri Company in 1910 was to expedite
the funding of the two hydroelectric plants.
45. Hauser also was pressured by the congressional authorization
to proceed with completion of the Holter Dam project. Federal attempts
to force time limits on dam projects threatened Hauser's permit for the
Wolf Creek facility. After consultation with Montana's Senator Thomas
H. Carter, Hauser was assured that he would have at least three more
years to complete Holter Dam. See letters, S. T. Hauser to Thomas A.
Carter, January 27, 1909, HP, Box 33, folder 2; and letter, Thomas H.
Carter to S. T. Hauser, January 30, 1909, HP, Box 29, folder 36.
46. Gerry estimated that the Rainbow plant would produce approxi
mately 17,500 horsepower of electricity. Letter, M. H. .Gerry to S. T.
Hauser, April 12, 1909, HP, Box 33, folder 12.

transmitted to Butte and Anaconda.

47

Clark implied that he was resigned

to the inevitability of losing the Amalgamated business and suggested to
Hauser that the United Missouri Company sell its Helena-to-Butte trans48
mission line to Ryan.
Although facing considerable financial pressure from the Holter Dam
project and the reconstruction effort at Hauser Dam, S. T. Hauser would
not accept defeat and agree to sell or lease his transmission lines.

In

March, 1910, M. H. Gerry informed Hauser that John Gillie, superinten
dent of the Amalgamated mines in Butte, stated that the power would be
disconnected "as-soon as the Great Falls plant was completed and in
49
readiness to deliver power."
Even at this critical point in the
future of his hydroelectric facilities, Hauser would not capitulate to
the Ryan/Wetmore combination and sell the power lines.
John D. Ryan dearly.

The delay cost

While the Rainbow plant was ready to furnish power

to Butte and Anaconda in early July, 1910, Ryan had to await construc50
tion of a new power line and substation on the Butte/Anaconda system.
In late July, 1910, the transmission facilities in Butte were com
plete and everything was ready for the delivery of power between that
47. Letter, William A. Clark to S. T. Hauser, September 10, 1909,
HP, Box 29, folder 38.
48.

Ibid.

49. Letter, M. H. Gerry to S. T. Hauser, March 16, 1910, HP,
Box 30, folder 18.
50. Letter, John D. Ryan to C. W. Wetmore, July 19, 1910, PSR,
Box 43, exhibit 116. Ryan laid direct responsibility for this delay to
Hauser's intransigence on the lease or sale of the United Missouri
Company's transmission lines.
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community and the Great Falls plant.

On Ju.ly.28, 1910, Ryan informed

C. W. Wetmore that, "I believe it is now safe to have the Amalgamated
Company give notice to the Missouri River Power Company, cancelling all
51
their contracts . . . "
Knowing that the transmission system would be
completed soon, Ryan also suggested that Amalgamated keep the Missouri
River Power Company contract that served the Anaconda smelters until the
Butte-to-Anaconda line could be finished.

Ryan estimated that notice

would be given to the United Missouri Company in time for a termination
of service on September 1, 1910.
Nineteen days after the July 28 letter, the Amalgamated Copper
Company gave formal notice to the United Missouri River Power Company
that three of the power firm's contracts would be terminated in thirty
52
days.
On September 17, the United Missouri lines were disconnected
from Amalgamated plants and the power was shifted to the Butte Electric
and Power Company.

The following month, the Butte Water Company and the
53
Butte Electric Company also terminated their contracts with Hauser.
By mid-November, 1910, Gerry unhappily announced to Hauser that "Amalga

mated have today transferred all their remaining power to the other
54
system."
51. Letter, John D. Ryan to C. W. Wetmore, July 28, 1910, PSR,
Box 43, exhibit 95.
52. The cancelled contracts included (1) a 1905 agreement for 4250
horsepower, (2) a 1904 agreement for 7,000 horsepower, (3) a 1901 agree
ment for 2,000 horsepower. See letter, John G. Brown to S. T. Hauser,
October 7, 1910, HP, Box 30, folder 19.
53. Letters, M. H. Gerry to S. T. Hauser, October 10 and 22, 1910,
HP, Box 30, folder 18.
54. Telegram, M. H. Gerry to S. T. Hauser, November 16, 1910,
HP, Box 30, folder 18.
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Notwithstanding the events that unfolded in mid-:August, 1910,
S. T. Hauser believed that he could ultimately retain control of his
hydroelectric facilities.

Hauser claimed that Amalgamated had illegally

cancelled the power contracts.

Specifically, Amalgamated had terminated

the 1905 agreement on the grounds that the period of contract had ex
pired.

Hauser and his attorney, William Wallace, Jr., on the other

hand, contended that the contract was still in force.

A clause in the

contract stipulated that if power from the plants was disrupted by an
"act of God," then "the terms of this contract shall be extended and
55
continued for a period equal to such suspension."
Although Amalga
mated 1 s lawyers asserted that the failure of Hauser Dam could be attri
buted to the negligence of the power company, Wallace and Hauser believed
otherwise.
Governor Hauser and his attorney argued the legal validity of their
cause,but the ability to withstand a protracted court battle over the
issues was clearly not theirs.

Amalgamated withheld payment for any

power that had been contracted after the termination date of September 17,
56
and Hauser had little recourse to collect the overdue account.
55. Letter, William Wallace, Jr., to S. T. Hauser, November 8,
1910, HP, Box 30, folder 19.
56. Letters, S. T. Hauser to W. B. Gower, August 23, 1910, HP,
Box 33, folder 13, and M. H. Gerry to S. T. Hauser, November 23, 1910,
HP, Box 30, folder 18. Attorney Wallace notified Amalgamated officials
in October, .1910, that the company would be held liable for the con
tracted power. This ultimatum had little affect on the copper trust's
attitude. See letter, John G. Brown to S. T. Hauser, October 7, 1910,
HP, Box 30, folder 19.
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S. T. Hauser had no success convincing the Amalgamated Copper Com
pany to honor its five-year-old agreement with the United Missouri River
Power Company.

The persistent capitalist did not despair, however, in

his belief that the copper company would eventually need power from his
hydroelectric holdings.

In a letter to New York financier Henry Seligman

in March, 1910, Hauser stated that the United Missouri Company had a
"connected load" from its customers of 26,000 horsepower, although the
failure of the dam prevented the firm from delivering that much power.
Hauser claimed an additional 30,000 horsepower that was being negoti
ated with present and prospective customers.Hauser posed the question
to Seligman, "How much of this 56,000 horsepower can Ryan, together
57
with the Wetmore Company, furnish."
He argued that, at best, Ryan's
Rainbow Dam plant could generate only 14,000 horsepower, and that little
of this would be available to customers outside the Great Falls area.
Hauser's estimation of the demand for electric power and his
assessment of the capacity of the Great Falls facility were clearly
inaccurate.

Indeed, while the Ryan plant proved to offer more than

20,000 horsepower once it was fully operational, Hauser restated his
belief that the plant could produce no more than 12,000 to 15,000
58
horsepower.
Unwaning optimism in the face of the Ryan/Wetmore com
bination could not protect Hauser from the affects of the loss of
57. Letter, S. T. Hauser to Henry Seligman, March 25, 1910, HP,
Box 33, folder 13.
58. Letters, S. T. Hauser to Henry Seligman, September 27, 1910,
HP, Box 33, folder 13, and S. T. Hauser to Henry Seligman, January 24,
1911, HP, Box 33, folder 14.
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Amalgamated's power business.

Hauser undoubtedly feared for the finan

cial future of his power companies in the late summer and early fall of
1910.

But he had little time to ponder the veracity of electrical

supply and demand predictions as he was forced to contend with the dis
affection of his most trusted financial supporters.
Difficulties with completing work on the Hauser and Holter Dams
prompted S. T. Hauser's concern over losing his financial backing.

An

inspection of the Montana hydroelectric plants, conducted by a key
Hauser financier, Henry Seligman, in June, 1910, helped allay some fears
over the future of the power companies.

But Hauser was anxious never

theless over "the recent effort of our opponents to break us
financially.
Efforts by Hauser to retain this principal financier were futile
in the face of Amalgamated's notice to terminate electric power con
tracts with the United Missouri River Power Company.

Although Hauser

received official notice of the termination in mid-August, 1910, he did
not inform Henry Seligman of the situation.

When Seligman learned of

59. Hauser was referring to the construction of Rainbow Dam and
the rumors of new contracts between Amalgamated and the Great Falls
firm. Letter, S. T. Hauser to John S. M. Neil, July 2, 1910, HP,
Box 33, folder 13. Seligman was not totally reassured of the United
Missouri Company's ability to withstand Ryan's economic pressure as an
August 1, 1910, letter from Hauser evidences. Seligman was assured by
Hauser that the company would do whatever was necessary to reach an
accommodation with Ryan and Wetmore—even if this meant consolidation
of power holdings. Hauser sought to impress Seligman, however, with
the enormous potential of the United Missouri Company's hydroelectric
power sites. Hauser reverted once again to hyperbolic statements re
garding the company's ability to meet a growing demand for electric
power. Letter, S. T. Hauser to Henry Seligman, August 1, 1910, HP,
Box 33, folder 13.
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the disconnection of Amalgamated power in mid-September, he was justi
fiably angry with Hauser.
Gerry wires that the Amalgamated Company have cut
off over 8,000 HP, and, judging from the notices
which were sent out recently, in another month all
the power will be cut off. I understand that the
Amalgamated gave notice in the early part of August
to this effect, and I consider it very wrong of
whoever is responsible for withholding this from
me, as had I been aware of this fapt, it would have
been barely possible to have averted what has been
done.®"
Seligman blamed the high cost of the third dam (Holter) on the
power company's problems and suggested that construction at the Wolf
Creek site be halted.

Even with this action, the New York banker anti

cipated great difficulties in solving the company's problems.

Referring

to negotiations with Amalgamated, he stated, "We cannot afford to dic
tate terms.
While Seligman was displeased that he had not been consulted about
the contract cancellations, he was furious that William A. Clark had
not been officially told of the terminations.

Seligman believed that

Clark was the man who could save the power company from ruin and that
Hauser had to be completely honest in conversations with the ex-senator.
I am dumbfounded at your behavior, for on Sunday
you had a four hours' interview with the Senator
and evidently failed to post him as to the true
condition of affairs. If you are not thoroughly
candid with the Senator who, in my opinion, is
60. Letter, Henry Seligman to S. T. Hauser, September 20, 1910,
HP, Box 30, folder 15.
61.

Ibid.
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the only man that can bring about a settlement,
I can see serious trouble staring you in the face.
Issuing a note of resignation, Seligman added that "I am getting thor
oughly disgusted with the whole business and am almost prepared to
quit." 63
M. A. Clark was probably not as unaware of the Amalgamated action
as Seligman implied.

Nonetheless, when he obtained the same telegram

from M. H. Gerry that Seligman had received, the ex-senator expressed
complete shock at the disconnections.

Of more surprise to Glark was

Mauser's lack of candor.
Mr. Gerry stated that no doubt you had advised me
of this at the meeting I had with you on Saturday.
If you had this information, I cannot understand
why you did not give it to me, as you in no wise
referred to it.64
Clark stated that the situation was now "quite critical" and that the
contract cancellations could stop negotiations on the future bond sale
65
and cause more financial difficulties.
Despite Hauser's promotion of the potential need for electric power
from the United Missouri Company's facilities, Seligman and Clark were
convinced that the Rainbow Dam plant would destroy their firm.

Of

particular concern to Seligman was Hauser's unwillingness to admit the
62. Letter, Henry Seligman to S. T. Hauser, September 22, 1910,
HP, Box 30, folder 15.
63.

Ibid.

64. Letter, W. A. Clark to S. T. Hauser, September 21, 1910, HP,
Box 30, folder 10.
65.

Ibid.
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threat posed by Ryan, Wetmore and Amalgamated.

They claimed that

Hauser's failure to inform either supporter of the United Missouri
Company's recent setbacks or to manage the company effectively prompted
them to abandon the threatened power business.

By late Septentoer, 1910,

two of the first supporters of Hauser's Helena Water and Electric Power
Company has rejected their old friend's unflagging optimism and urged
a consolidation with Ryan and Wetmore.
On September 28, 1910, Seligman informed Hauser that the Board of
Directors at the United Missouri River Power Company had created a new
Executive Committee.

In the future, General Manager M. H. Gerry would

report directly to the Board and not to Hauser.

Although Hauser was

appointed to the committee, Seligman was "most anxious to have one of
the Amalgamated on that Committee."

Amalgamated, of course, still owned

stock in the United Missouri River Power Company.

66

Formation of this Executive Committee marked the end of Hauser's
control over the direction of the power companies.

His investors had

acknowledged the increasing demand for industrial electricity in Montana
and had tolerated the long months of delay and rising costs of the two
Hauser-sponsored Missouri River dams.

Yet, the persistent efforts of

the Ryan/Wetmore combination broke the personal and financial bond
between Hauser and his eastern source of capital.

The former gover

nor's insistence that his facilities would eventually share in the
state's electrical future had little influence with men who had already
66. Letter, Henry Seligman to S. T. Hauser, September 28, 1910,
HP, Box 30, folder 15.
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" 67
bowed to Amalgamated.:
In the months that followed the September defection of his finan
cial support, S. T. Hauser attempted to re-establish his leadership of
the United Missouri River Power Company.

He reaffirmed his previous

statements that the Ryan/Wetmore combination could not supply all of
the electrical power demand in Montana.

Hauser optimistically pre

dicted that the Helena-based power companies would eventually garner
a fair share of the industrial power market in the state. 68 Termina
tion of the Amalgamated contracts and the disconnection of the United
Missouri Company's transmission lines did not-encourage Hauser's in
vestors to wait for the inevitable increased demand.
In March, 1910, Hauser's companies were supplying approximately
19,000 horsepower of electricity to their customers.

Of this load,

between 6,000 and 10,000 horsepower was supplied by Wetmore under the
1908 agreement with Hauser.

As much as 4,000 horsepower was being

generated by the expensive Butte steam auxiliary plant owned by the
69
United Missouri Company.
Following cancellation of the copper
67. Hauser was correct, of course, in assuming that his plants
were needed in the total development of hydroelectric power in Montana.
As noted in the 1908 Cooper and Powelson Report, Hauser's plants were
an important part of the Missouri River Basin power system. The alli
ance between Wetmore and Ryan was one of expediency and one that anti
cipated the eventual assumption of the Hauser-controlled interests.
68. See various letters, S. T. Hauser to W. A. Clark, October 3,
1910, HP, Box 33, folder 13; S. T. Hauser to W. A. Clark, October 12,
1910, HP, Box 30, folder 18; S. T. Hauser to Henry Seligman, January 17,
1911, HP, Box 33, folder 14.
69. Hauser continually altered figures for the amount of power
that Wetmore's firm supplied to United Missouri River customers. In
one estimate to Henry Seligman in March, 1910, Hauser suggested that

trust's contracts with Hauser, the aging capitalist's power contracts
were reduced to a minimal 4,000 horsepower.

In early 1911, Hauser

tried to show his disaffected supporters that projected power sales
would soon raise the company's distribution to 20,000 constant and
intermittent horsepower.

But the old promoter's principal backers,

Clark and Seligman, were not encouraged by these extravagant estimates.
During the late fall and early winter of 1910-1911, Henry Seligman led
the efforts of the newly-formed Executive Committee to reach an agree
ment between the Ryan/Wetmore combination and the United Missouri River
Power Company.^

At Seligman's urging, the Executive Committee halted
72
work at Holter Dam near Wolf Creek.
The defection of old friend William A. Clark was a special blow to
the aging S. T. Hauser.

During the succeeding months, Clark sought the

counsel of Hauser and kept his co-investor informed of negotiations
between Seligman, Ryan and the Amalgamated people.

Notwithstanding

these courtesies, Clark had long since abandoned hopes for the survival
the figure was between 3,000 and 5,000 horsepower. Later that year, he
indicated that a more accurate figure was between 6,000 and 10,000
horsepower. It is more likely that the figure for constant horsepower
was closer to the 6,000 than 10,000 horsepower estimate. See letters,
S. T. Hauser to Henry Seligman, March 25, 1910, and September 27, 1910,
HP, Box 33, folder 13.
70. Letters, S. T. Hauser to Henry Seligman, January 24, 1911,
and S. T. Hauser to W. A. Clark, March 3, 1911, HP, Box 33, folder 14,
S. T. Hauser to W. A. Clark, March 10, 1911, HP, Box 33, folder 14.
71. Letters, W. A. Clark to S. T. Hauser, October 15, 1910,
October 25, 1910, HP, Box 33, folder 10, and S. T. Hauser to W. A.
Clark, January 16, 1911, HP, Box 33, folder 14.
72. Letter, D. P. Robinson to S. T. Hauser, November 29, 1910,
HP, Box 30, folder 17.
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of the United Missouri River Power Company under the leadership of
S. T. Hauser.

After September, 1910, the ex-senator openly supported

attempts by the United Missouri Company's directorate to reach an
73
accommodation with Ryan and Wetmore.
During the spring and summer of 1911, Henry Seligman negotiated
with Ryan and Wetmore for the sale of the United Missouri River Power
Company.

Hauser, meanwhile, futilely worked with Helena newspaperman

J. S. Neil to effect a reorganization of the company.

When that effort

failed in March, 1911, Hauser could no longer prevent sale of his power
74
business.
In April, 1911, Hauser finally capitulated to the Butte
75
Electric and Power Company.
73. Clark's exasperation with Hauser is particularly noted in the
politician's skepticism of Hauser's low power production figures for
the Great Falls plant. Noting the discrepancies between M. H. Gerry's
estimates for the facility (11,000 - 14,000 horsepower) and engineer
Max Hebgen's projections (20,000 horsepower), Clark warned Hauser to
beware of being misled.
Somebody is off about this business, and are wrong
and they have misled you to feel that the United
Missouri River Power Company was independent of the
Amalgamated Copper Company and that they would be
obliged to take our power, then of course they will
have led you and the rest of us into a hole from
which it will be difficult for us to extricate
ourselves. [Letter, W. A. Clark to S. T. Hauser,
January 18, 1911, HP, Box 30, folder 22.]
74. After repeated correspondence with Hauser in March, 1910,
J. S. Neil reported to the United Missouri Company president that his
"party declines to make investment because my proposition does not
give him ownership of a majority of the stock." Telegram, J. S. Neil
to S. T. Hauser, March 25, 1911, HP, Box 30, folder 26.
75. Telegram, John S. Neil to S. T. Hauser, April 10, 1911, HP,
Box 30, folder 26.
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There were changes in personnel at the reorganized United Missouri
River Power Company in the summer of 1911.

William Gower, secretary

for the company during its long fight with Ryan and Wetmore, was re76
placed in July by R. S. Condit.
The following month, M. H. Gerry
was demoted from general manager to consulting engineer.

Max Hebgen, ^

formerly of the Butte Electric and Power Company, joined the United
Missouri River Company as its new general manager.

This latter change

was instigated by John D. Ryan.^
S. T. Hauser retained a financial and official interest in the
United Missouri River Power Company after its sale to the Butte firm.
At the United Missouri Company's November meeting, Hauser was re
elected to the presidency of the reorganized business.

Despite

Hauser's title, Albert Strauss, of J. W. Seligman and Company, directed
the new organization as Chairman of the Reorganization Committee.

After

so long a battle, the seventy-nine-year-old Hauser was in no position
to challenge Strauss' leadership.

Hauser's resignation as a director

and president of the United Missouri River Power Company on June 19,
78
1912, undoubtedly surprised nobody.
New personnel and leadership at the United Missouri Company wet 4 ?
precursors to.greater changes. Two weeks prior to Hauser's resignation from
76. Letter, R. S. Condit to M. H. Gerry, July 24, 1911, HP,
Box 30, folder 31.
77. Letter, J. D. Ryan to Max Hebgen, August 14, 1911, PSR,
exhibit 199.
78. Letter, S. T. Hauser to Board of Directors, United Missouri
River Power Company, June 19, 1912, HP, Box 33, folder 15.
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from the Board of Directors of his old company, holders of notes of the
79
United Missouri Company formed the Butte Syndicate.
It was this group
of investors led by C. W. Wetmore and the Butte Electric and Power Com
pany that joined with John D. Ryan to form the Montana Power Company on
80
December 12, 1912.
John D. Ryan and C. W. Wetmore had indeed made
"the young old man a heap of trouble."
A number pf forces and events combined to trouble S. T. Hauser
following the collapse of Hauser Dam in April, 1908.

Overwhelming

financial requirements caused by the simultaneous construction of two
hydroelectric facilites created a severe cash problem for the electric
power promoter.

Constantly rising costs of both major projects forced

the former Montana governor to make repeated overtures to his supporters
for additional funds.
Construction and design problems faced by the Stone and Webster
Engineering Corporation contributed to the delays and to the resultant
cost increases.

Although Hauser never shared General Manager Gerry's

distrust of the nationally-known construction firm, he did believe that
Stone and Webster had poor leadership at the Montana construction sites.
79.

Butte Syndicate, April 24, 1913, HP, Box 62, folder 52.

80. The Montana Power Company included the Butte Electric and
Power Company and its three principal subsidiaries: the United Missouri
River Power Company, the Billings and Eastern Montana Power Company and
the Madison River Power Company. For a more detailed description of the
merger, see Douglas Leighton's "The Montana Power Company," passim.
(Hauser retained some stock in the Montana Power Company through his
Helena and Livingston Smelting and Refinirw-Gonmato'.*} Letter, J. & W.
Seligman and Company to S. T. Hauser, Marcn 4, 1913, HP, Box 31,
folder 11.
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In a letter to W. A. Clark following the cancellation of /the Amalgamated
contracts, Hauser stated that:
Stone and Webster are honorable men, but I believe
their manager has made a terrible failure (costing
us hundreds of thousands of dollars), that he has
become demoralized and is doing what he can to
hedge out. 8 '
Hauser claimed that the demise of the United Missouri River Power Company
could be laid directly at the feet of the Stone and Webster Company's
82
local management.
S. T. Hauser's character and personal dynamism could have assisted
him in solving the difficult problems with Hauser~and Holter~dams7
His past career in banking, in mining, and in hydroelectric development
evidenced the promoter's ability to align supporters and to surmount
perplexing financial hurdles.

Hauser may have accomplished these entre

preneurial feats had he not encountered the opposition of John D. Ryan.
The junior capitalist had such strong corporate support for his hydro
electric ventures that attempts by the senior Hauser to counter Ryan's
plans were fruitless.

Once John Ryan succeeded to the presidency of

the Amalgamated Copper Company and had allied with C. W. Wetmore's
Butte Electric and Power Company, S. T. Hauser's fate was sealed.

The

Amalgamated Company was the major consumer of industrial electricity
in Montana.

The copper trust's conversion to electrical power and its

assumption of other mining properties in 1906 insured that the power
81. Letter, S. T. Hauser to W. A. Clark, November 1, 1910,
HP, Box 33, folder 13.
82.

Ibid.
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company who served Butte and Anaconda would dominate electrical power
production in the state.
Hauser was correct in assuming that his Missouri River properties
were valuable, if not crucial, to the success of the Ryan/Wetmore power
combination.

Without the control of Canyon Ferry, Hauser, and the

future Holter Dam, the Butte Syndicate would have been threatened periodically by insufficient water for its generators.
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Hauser's oldest

and staunchest supporters, Henry Seligman and W. A. Clark, recognized
this fact.

They also acknowledged the strength of John D. Ryan and

Amalgamated.

Cancellation of power contracts in September, 1910,

emphasized to Seligman and Clark that S. T. Hauser's United Missouri
River Power Company was vulnerable and could easily be forced into
bankruptcy.
collapse.

Their subsequent defection from Hauser caused his financial
In the end, S. T. Hauser's promotions had been directed at

the wrong people.
83. In October, 1910, the Butte Company's general manager, Max
Hebgen, wrote to John D. Ryan, warning that if the Hauser Dam flood
gates were closed "when the Great Falls company is using practically
the whole flow of the river, they could, for a period of three or four
days, cut off the flow at Rainbow very materially." Letter, Max Hebgen
to John D. Ryan, October 17, 1910, PSR, Box 43, exhibit 186.

EPILOGUE

THE OPPORTUNITY OF ELECTRIC POWER

The possibility of making electricity a commercial power source
offered nineteenth century capitalists a new economic frontier to ex
ploit.

Steam-generated electricity was the first form of the new power

to be applied to industrial America, since these plants could be
erected adjacent to manufacturing centers.

But George Westinghouse's

experiments with high-voltage electric transmission in the late 1880s
convinced most electrical entrepreneurs that a large, central station
power source was both practical and economically efficient.

It was the

ability to transmit electric current that spurred development of hydro
electric power plants in the United States.
Montana, along with her western state neighbors, was particularly
blessed with water-power sites.

And, of all the high mountain rivers

and streams susceptible to hydroelectric generation, it was the Missouri
River that offered the greatest prospects for the development of a cen
tral station power plant.

Very early in the twentieth century, Montana

investors recognized the value of the river and pursued its control and
harnessing for industrialization.

The Missouri presented an opportunity

that local capitalists could not ignore.

Their exploitation of that

opportunity during the period 1898-1912 left a legacy of combination of
public utilities and a pattern of development that reflected the strength
128
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of the state's mining industry.
Samuel T. Hauser was but one individual who recognized the potential
for applying electric power to Montana's mines and smelters.

He was one

of the first individuals to take advantage of long distance electrical
transmission.

The scale of his hydroelectric development was unparal

leled at the time.

Yet, while Hauser was responsible for demonstrating

the economic possibilities of the new power source, he did not share in
the long-term benefits of his pioneer efforts.
The entrance of John D. Ryan and Charles Wetmore, both of whom had
strong financial support from national industrial firms, interrupted
Hauser's plans for controlling the hydroelectric potential of the
Missouri.

Nature's hand, in the form of a spring freshet in April,

1908, aided Wetmore and Ryan in their attempt to destroy Hauser.

But,

the former Montana governor's own financial instability and inability
to prosecute construction of Holter Dam and Hauser Dam prompted abandon
ment by his closest financial friends and his eventual loss of control
of the United Missouri River Power Company.

A consummate promoter, an

aging S. T. Hauser had, perhaps, proceeded too quickly in attempting to
establish his hydroelectric empire on the upper Missour River.
The failure of Hauser Dam in 1908 may have encourage Ryan and
Wetmore to seize that opportunity to combine forces, to rush completion
of the new Rainbow Dam, and to tighten the competitive squeeze on
Hauser.

Notwithstanding the timing of events, it seems clear that the

various interests planned a power combination as early as 1904.

The

exact scenario for effecting the formation of the syndicate was not
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apparent until 1908, but few influential electric power entrepreneurs
disputed the inevitability of such a monopoly.
The Amalgamated Copper Company also did not argue with the combina
tion of power producers.

By 1905, the company's chief executive, H. H.

Rogers, had become convinced of the applicability of electricity to
Amalgamated's operations—much of this conviction due to the efforts of
S. T. Hauser.

The network of high-voltage transmission lines that ex

tended towards Butte and Anaconda beginning in 1901 evidenced the copper
trust's acceptance of the new power.
There is no conclusive evidence of collusion between John D. Ryan
and the Amalgamated Copper Company in financing what ultimately became
the Montana Power Company.

Ryan always maintained that he had found

independent financial support.

These protestations, however, do not

dismiss the questionable nature of Ryan's business connections.
A federal investigator queried John Ryan in 1921 about the power
developer's corporate associations during the 1909-1912 period.

The

lawyer wondered if Ryan's presidency of Anaconda Copper Mining Company,
his later leadership in Amalgamated, and his directorship in the Chicago,
Milwaukee, St. Paul Railway Company (a company that electrified part of
its railroad in 1918) did not influence various decisions regarding the
power business.

In response, Ryan explained that his actions benefited

all of the companies involved in the transactions and that "an honest
individual can make this determination [of benefit]."^

Despite Ryan's

1. "Testimony of John D. Ryan Before the Interstate Commerce
Commission in the Investigation of the Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul
Railway Company," ICC Doc. No. 17021, November 17, 1921, PSR, Box 43,
exhibit 145.
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assertions of objectivity, every event in the process that began to un
fold in 1908 augmented his (Ryan's) personal wealth and influence.
H. H. Rogers may have agreed to accept electric power from Ryan's com
pany for the good of Amalgamated following the failure of Hauser Dam in
1908.

Nonetheless, when John Ryan assumed leadership of Amalgamated in

1909, there could be little doubt that future power development on the
Missouri would revolve around the interests of the new copper trust
president.

Hauser had always acknowledged the importance of aligning

with the Amalgamated Company.

But he was unable to continue the alli

ance once H. H. Rogers died and John Ryan moved to New York.
The combination of John Ryan's and Charles Wetmore's power com
panies, the bankruptcy of S. T. Hauser's United Missouri River Power
Company and the formation of the Montana Power Company secured the bond
between the mining industry and hydroelectric producers in Montana.
Those events also enabled electric production and distribution in the
state to be monopolized.

Early efforts at electrification in Montana

had concentrated on supplying power for residential lighting to the
state's communities.

Formation of the Montana Power Company in 1912,

however, was intended to produce electric power for large industry, not
small consumers.

While the thrust of Montana Power Company's capital

effort has no doubt allowed numerous small Montana towns to receive the
benefits of electricity (a point that the Company has never neglected to
make), the Company was not created on that premise.
Fears of the effects of monopolization of electric producers in
Montana and other states surfaced on the national level at an early date.
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In 1912, the U. S. Bureau of Corporations reported on the trend towards
combination in the industry and the possibility that only a few large
utility security companies would eventually control all of the electric
2
production in the country.
This concern prompted Congress to authorize
a study of electric power development in 1915.

A three-part report,

published in January, 1916, suggests that a monopoly in electric power
producers was already apparent.

In the area of water power development,

the expansion in western states increased four hundred and fifty-one
percent between 1902 and 1912 compared to ninety-eight percent for the
East during the same period.

Consolidation of power interests was par3
ticularly evident in this development.
The report concludes that inter

locking directorships among power companies was impossible to determine.
Yet, the report adds, "these data show potential control, a marked
tendency toward association or community of interests, particularly be
tween the principal holding companies, that cannot be viewed without
4
concern."
It was this trend in hydroelectric power development that
raised congressional interest in regulating the industry and aided
efforts to pass the Federal Water Power Act of 1920.
The enactment of this national scenario in Montana did not occur
without casualties.

C. W. Wetmore, who considered himself the architect

2. Bureau of Corporation, "Report of the Commissioner of Corpora
tions on Water-Power Development," passim.
3. U.S. Senate, Electric Power Development in the United States,
64th Cong., 1st Sess., Senate Doc. No. 316 (1916), pp. 13-15.
4.

Ibid., p. 15.
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of the Butte Syndicate and the Montana Power Company, suffered a nervous
breakdown in December, 1912.

While recuperating in England during the

winter of 1913, Wetmore learned that the first presidency of the new
company had been given to John D. Ryan.

Angry and distraught, Wetmore

wrote to Ryan in May, 1913, expressing his outrage at the turn of events.
1 think you will not be surprised when I say that
I feel I have been grossly betrayed, humiliated
and outraged by the men of n\y own group. I created
the Montana Power Company, and I did it alone. 5
Wetmore recognized that Ryan was in a "difficult position" but urged
him to accept the contributions that the former Butte Electric and Power
Company president had made and to restore him (Wetmore) to his proper
position. 6

Wetmore must have been sorely grieved when John Ryan con

tinued as president of the Montana Power Company.
Samuel T. Hauser was a second victim of the formation of the
Montana Power Company.

Hauser was one of the first Montanans to attempt

electric production from water power facilities.

Through his promotion,

the value of that new power source was demonstrated.

Always in the

forefront of activity on Montana's economic frontier, Hauser erected
the first large hydroelectric power plant in Montana.

He also pointed

the way towards the creation of an industrial market for the new product.
In his declining years, Hauser could look to these accomplishments of
his participation in hydroelectric development.

At his death in

November, 1914, however, he could not look with equal pride to his
5. Letter, C. W. Wetmore to John D. Ryan, May 19, 1913, PSR,
Box 29(1), exhibit 305.
6.

Ibid.
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continued involvement in the electric industry.

Throughout his long

career on the Montana frontier, S. T. Hauser had often been the first
to see the potential of new industry.

His economic prescience continued

into the twentieth century with an endeavor that was destined to be con
trolled by others.
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